Egchq Egc — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@egchq/egc",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@egchq/egc"
},
"server": {
"name": "@egchq/egc"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"validate_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"validate_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dashboard/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dashboard/server.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dashboard/server.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const { KNOWN_IDES, createAccumulator } = require('./accumulator'); const { TOK",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dashboard/server.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { llmRoute, keywordRoute, llmRoutingEnabled, hasProviderKey } from './llm",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js"
},
"evidence": "re\\s*\\(\\s*['\"](?:node:)?child_process['\"]\\s*\\)/, reason: 'child_process injection' }, { category: 'exfiltration', pa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "\"node:fs\")); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_crypto_1 = require(\"node:crypto\"); c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js"
},
"evidence": "re\\s*\\(\\s*['\"](?:node:)?child_process['\"]\\s*\\)/, reason: 'child_process injection' }, { pattern: /import\\s*\\{[^}]*\\b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js",
"line": 41,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"validate_command\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"validate_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_command",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js:55`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js"
},
"evidence": "\\.pem$/, /\\.key$/, /id_rsa/, ]; /** * Generate a unique event ID. */ function generateEventId() { return `gov-$",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js",
"line": 55,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"validate_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"validate_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/auto-update.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/auto-update.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/auto-update.js"
},
"evidence": "nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { version: PKG_VERSION } = require('../package.json'); const { discoverI",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/auto-update.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build-opencode.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build-opencode.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/build-opencode.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync } = require(\"node:child_process\") const rootDir = path.resolve(__dirname, \"..\") const opencodeDir = path.join(roo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/build-opencode.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync } = require('node:child_process'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const DENYLIST = ['multica']; // The checker's",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-state-leak.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-state-leak.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/check-state-leak.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync } = require('node:child_process'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const SECTION_HEADING = '## EGC Project Memory'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/check-state-leak.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js:239`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js"
},
"evidence": "ce: 'scripts/gemini.js: spawnSync(pythonBin, [\"-m\", \"llm.cli.prompt\", ...])' }, { from: 'memory:persiste",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js",
"line": 239,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/dashboard.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/dashboard.js:20`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/dashboard.js"
},
"evidence": "on getPort() { return require(PORT_HELPER).PORT; } function isRunning() { const port = getPort(); return new Prom",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/dashboard.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js:8`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js"
},
"evidence": "h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } const globalState = tryRequire('../lib/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js"
},
"evidence": "h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } // Repo layout first, flattened install",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js:145`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js"
},
"evidence": "ry { hookModule = require(scriptPath); } catch (requireErr) { process.stderr.write(`[Hook] require() fai",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js",
"line": 145,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js:20`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js"
},
"evidence": "h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } // Reuses the SmartCrusher from egc-gua",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js:16`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js"
},
"evidence": "h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } const propagateStateLib = tryRequire('.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@egchq/egc\" executes preinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@egchq/egc"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/preinstall.js",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"preinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "validate_command",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "validate_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reduce_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrate_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auto_learn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_announce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claim_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_peers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "working_memory_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "working_memory_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "working_memory_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lesson_save",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lesson_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lesson_reinforce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compress_observations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "team_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "team_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "team_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c0154e575a24cb5ede8b666c68dcefe0bd46083cc1b0a2cc5abae99f883bbf09",
"stats": {
"tools": 30,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 1,
"low": 14,
"info": 0
}
}
}