Egchq Egc MCP Server
@egchq/egc
npm
v1.1.21
Source verified
Published by fmarzochi — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
EGC is a local-first MCP runtime that gives every AI agent the same brain: persistent shared memory, security guardrails, and up to 90% token savings across 23 AI coding tools.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Tool "validate_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "validate_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool validate_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dashboard/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dashboard/server.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const { KNOWN_IDES, createAccumulator } = require('./accumulator'); const { TOK
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dashboard/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { llmRoute, keywordRoute, llmRoutingEnabled, hasProviderKey } from './llm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: re\s*\(\s*['"](?:node:)?child_process['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'child_process injection' }, { category: 'exfiltration', pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/servers/egc-guardian/build/prompt-injection-scanner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "node:fs")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto"); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: re\s*\(\s*['"](?:node:)?child_process['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'child_process injection' }, { pattern: /import\s*\{[^}]*\b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/servers/egc-memory/build/sanitize.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "validate_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "validate_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool validate_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js:55`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \.pem$/, /\.key$/, /id_rsa/, ]; /** * Generate a unique event ID. */ function generateEventId() { return `gov-$
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/hooks/governance-capture.js
low Mutating tool "validate_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "validate_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool validate_command
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/auto-update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/auto-update.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { version: PKG_VERSION } = require('../package.json'); const { discoverI
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/auto-update.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build-opencode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build-opencode.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync } = require("node:child_process") const rootDir = path.resolve(__dirname, "..") const opencodeDir = path.join(roo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build-opencode.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync } = require('node:child_process'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const DENYLIST = ['multica']; // The checker's
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-internal-tool-leak.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-state-leak.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-state-leak.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync } = require('node:child_process'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const SECTION_HEADING = '## EGC Project Memory'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-state-leak.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js:239`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ce: 'scripts/gemini.js: spawnSync(pythonBin, ["-m", "llm.cli.prompt", ...])' }, { from: 'memory:persiste
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/ci/runtime-topology.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/dashboard.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/dashboard.js:20`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: on getPort() { return require(PORT_HELPER).PORT; } function isRunning() { const port = getPort(); return new Prom
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/dashboard.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js:8`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } const globalState = tryRequire('../lib/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/hooks/egc-memory-load.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } // Repo layout first, flattened install
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/hooks/pre-bash-crusher-rewrite.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js:145`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry { hookModule = require(scriptPath); } catch (requireErr) { process.stderr.write(`[Hook] require() fai
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/hooks/run-with-flags.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js:20`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } // Reuses the SmartCrusher from egc-gua
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/lib/crusher/engine.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js:16`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h) { try { return require(modulePath); } catch { return null; } } const propagateStateLib = tryRequire('.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/lib/session-context-loader.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@egchq/egc" executes preinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/preinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @egchq/egc
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
validate_commandruns code / shellauto_learnno sensitive capabilityclaim_pathno sensitive capabilitycompress_observationsno sensitive capabilitydetect_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_project_stateno sensitive capabilityget_stateno sensitive capabilitylesson_recallno sensitive capabilitylesson_reinforceno sensitive capabilitylesson_saveno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
orchestrate_taskno sensitive capabilityquery_historyno sensitive capabilityreduce_contextno sensitive capabilityrelease_pathno sensitive capabilitysearch_historyno sensitive capabilitysession_announceno sensitive capabilitysession_eventsno sensitive capabilitysession_peersno sensitive capabilitysession_sendno sensitive capabilitysession_waitno sensitive capabilitystore_decisionno sensitive capabilityteam_initno sensitive capabilityteam_statusno sensitive capabilityteam_syncno sensitive capabilityupdate_stateno sensitive capabilityvalidate_contentno sensitive capabilityvalidate_writeno sensitive capabilityworking_memory_getno sensitive capabilityworking_memory_listno sensitive capabilityworking_memory_setno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.21 latest |
A 93/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v1.1.20 |
A 93/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.1.18 |
A 93/100 | 21 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v1.1.17 |
A 93/100 | 21 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v1.1.15 |
A 93/100 | 21 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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