Drupal Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@e0ipso/drupal-bridge-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@e0ipso/drupal-bridge-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@e0ipso/drupal-bridge-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 97,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 2.22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.12
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "minimal",
"label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "minimal",
"reasons": [],
"tags": []
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts:101`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "healthResponse = await fetch( `http://${TEST_HOST}:${TEST_PORT}/health` ); expect(healthResponse.ok).toBe",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts",
"line": 101,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js:6`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js",
"line": 6
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js:13`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js",
"line": 13
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts:9`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts",
"line": 9
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts:16`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts",
"line": 16
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); // Chalk instance - loaded dynamically to handle ESM module let chalkInstance",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Run ESLint with the provided arguments (using flat config) const eslintArgs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "f0aac01fd9f3e194688ae1c8869f0b7b5dab083d4aa1da9910b6d0b7b2168fbe",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 7,
"info": 0
}
}
}