Drupal Bridge MCP Server
@e0ipso/drupal-bridge-mcp
npm
v2.1.2
Published by @e0ipso — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Minimal Drupal MCP Server - 336 lines vs 6000 lines (94% reduction!)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 2.2 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging ×4 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 1 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts:101`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: healthResponse = await fetch( `http://${TEST_HOST}:${TEST_PORT}/health` ); expect(healthResponse.ok).toBe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/oauth-metadata-discovery.test.ts
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js:6`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.js
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js:13`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/utils/__tests__/logger.test.js
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts:9`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server src/oauth/__tests__/jwt-decoder.test.ts
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts:16`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server src/utils/__tests__/logger.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); // Chalk instance - loaded dynamically to handle ESM module let chalkInstance
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .ai/task-manager/config/scripts/check-task-dependencies.cjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Run ESLint with the provided arguments (using flat config) const eslintArgs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/lint-staged-eslint.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.2 latest |
A 97/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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