Dynamic (42Research) MCP Server
dynamic-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.9
Published by 42research — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for dynamic analysys: BPFtrace, crash dump
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 24
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_crash_info, start_crash_session]) and tools that can send data out ([crash_command, execute_bpftrace_script, execute_bash_command, execute_bash_background, execute_bpftrace_background]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_crash_info, start_crash_session] → sinks [crash_command, execute_bpftrace_script, execute_bash_command, execute_bash_background, execute_bpftrace_b
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_crash_info → crash_command
high Tool "crash_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "crash_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool crash_command
high Tool "execute_bpftrace_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_bpftrace_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_bpftrace_script
high Tool "execute_bash_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_bash_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_bash_command
high Tool "execute_bash_background" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_bash_background" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_bash_background
high Tool "execute_bpftrace_background" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_bpftrace_background" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_bpftrace_background
high Shell/command execution in server code (setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`setup.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ilable result = subprocess.run( ["which", "setfacl"], capture_output=True, t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic_mcp/background_jobs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic_mcp/background_jobs.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["which", "bpftrace"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic_mcp/background_jobs.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic_mcp/bpftrace_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic_mcp/bpftrace_executor.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["which", "bpftrace"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic_mcp/bpftrace_executor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic_mcp/config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic_mcp/config.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(["crash", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) requi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic_mcp/config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic_mcp/permission_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic_mcp/permission_manager.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ilable result = subprocess.run( ["which", "setfacl"], capture_output=True, t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic_mcp/permission_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic_mcp/systemd_installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic_mcp/systemd_installer.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ilable result = subprocess.run( ["which", "setfacl"], capture_output=True, t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic_mcp/systemd_installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic_mcp/tunnel_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic_mcp/tunnel_manager.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run( ["cloudflared", "--version"], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic_mcp/tunnel_manager.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (setup.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`setup.py:172`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: with urllib.request.urlopen( "https://api.github.com/repos/cloudflare/cloudflared
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.py
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "crash_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "crash_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool crash_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "execute_bpftrace_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_bpftrace_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_bpftrace_script · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_bash_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_bash_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_bash_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_bash_background"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_bash_background" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_bash_background · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "execute_bpftrace_background"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_bpftrace_background" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_bpftrace_background · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "crash_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "crash_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool crash_command
low Mutating tool "execute_bpftrace_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_bpftrace_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_bpftrace_script
low Mutating tool "execute_bash_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_bash_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_bash_command
low Mutating tool "execute_bash_background" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_bash_background" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_bash_background
low Mutating tool "execute_bpftrace_background" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_bpftrace_background" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_bpftrace_background
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
crash_commandruns code / shellexecute_bash_backgroundruns code / shellexecute_bash_commandruns code / shellexecute_bpftrace_backgroundruns code / shellexecute_bpftrace_scriptruns code / shellget_crash_inforeads sensitive datastart_crash_sessionreads sensitive dataclose_crash_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_bpftrace_infono sensitive capabilityget_job_outputno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
get_source_fileno sensitive capabilitykill_jobno sensitive capabilitylist_crash_dumpsno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_source_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_source_filesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.9 latest |
A 93/100 | 24 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.0.7 |
A 93/100 | 24 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.3.4 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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