Dynamic (mcpland) MCP Server
dynamic-mcp
npm
v0.4.1
Source verified
Published by mcpland — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
A production-grade **dynamic MCP server** for Node.js
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Tool "sandbox.exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "sandbox.exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox.exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config/runtime.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config/runtime.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ED_PACKAGES ?? 'child_process,node-pty,npm,pm2'); const executionEngine = parseExecutionEngineMode(args['exe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config/runtime.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dynamic/docker-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/dynamic/docker-executor.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { clipText, formatToolSuccessText
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dynamic/docker-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dynamic/node-sandbox-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/dynamic/node-sandbox-executor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dynamic/node-sandbox-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sandbox/docker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sandbox/docker.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sandbox/docker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/config/runtime.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/config/runtime.ts:122`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: CKED_PACKAGES ?? 'child_process,node-pty,npm,pm2' ); const executionEngine = parseExecutionEngineMode( arg
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/config/runtime.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic/docker-executor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic/docker-executor.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import type { CallToolResult } from '@mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic/docker-executor.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dynamic/node-sandbox-executor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dynamic/node-sandbox-executor.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dynamic/node-sandbox-executor.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/sandbox/docker.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/sandbox/docker.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/sandbox/docker.ts
low Mutating tool "sandbox.exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "sandbox.exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox.exec
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
sandbox.execruns code / shelldev.echono sensitive capabilitydynamic.tool.createno sensitive capabilitydynamic.tool.deleteno sensitive capabilitydynamic.tool.enableno sensitive capabilitydynamic.tool.getno sensitive capabilitydynamic.tool.listno sensitive capabilitydynamic.tool.updateno sensitive capabilityrun_js_ephemeralno sensitive capabilitysandbox.initializeno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
sandbox.run_jsno sensitive capabilitysandbox.session.listno sensitive capabilitysandbox.stopno sensitive capabilitysystem.guard_metricsno sensitive capabilitysystem.healthno sensitive capabilitysystem.runtime_configno sensitive capabilitytime.nowno sensitive capabilityupstream.mcp.attachno sensitive capabilityupstream.mcp.detachno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan dynamic-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Dynamic 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
MCP Server providing comprehensive access to Dynamic Labs documentation, GitHub repositories, API references, and code examples for Claude Code
MCP server for dynamic analysys: BPFtrace, crash dump
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