Ds — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ds-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ds-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "ds-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: fetch_webpage → github_read_file → http_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "fetch_webpage → github_read_file → http_request"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"fetch_webpage",
"search_web",
"wikipedia",
"youtube_transcript"
],
"sources": [
"read_file",
"github_read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"run_background_process",
"http_request",
"run_shell_command"
],
"path": [
"fetch_webpage",
"github_read_file",
"http_request"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "fetch_webpage",
"to": "github_read_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "github_read_file",
"to": "http_request",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"run_shell_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"run_shell_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_shell_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py:407`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py"
},
"evidence": "rt modules, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes.\" ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py",
"line": 407,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py:226`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py"
},
"evidence": "rt modules, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes.\" ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py",
"line": 226,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/server.py:44`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/server.py"
},
"evidence": "eges — imports, open(), eval(),\", \"!! subprocess, etc. are all allowed.\", \"!!\", \"!! A hostile da",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/server.py",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py:407`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py"
},
"evidence": "les, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes.\" ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py",
"line": 407,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py:226`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py"
},
"evidence": "les, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes.\" ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py",
"line": 226,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py"
},
"evidence": "oduced by the LLM and `exec()` it in-process. Because the LLM's input can be influenced by any file, webpage, or datas",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "r(\"~\") result = subprocess.run( command, shell=True, capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"run_shell_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run_shell_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_shell_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sandbox.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sandbox.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_sandbox.py"
},
"evidence": "('1+1')\", \"exec('x=1')\", \"compile('x','<s>','exec')\", \"open('/etc/passwd')\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_sandbox.py",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"fetch_webpage",
"search_web",
"wikipedia",
"youtube_transcript"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"read_file",
"github_read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"run_background_process",
"http_request",
"run_shell_command"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"fetch_webpage",
"github_read_file",
"http_request"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: fetch_webpage → github_read_file → http_request."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_histogram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_scatterplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_boxplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_lineplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_correlation_heatmap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_barchart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_interactive_scatter_matrix",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_custom_plotly",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_all_columns_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_column_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_histogram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_scatterplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_boxplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_lineplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_barchart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_custom_static_plot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_pairplot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_wordcloud",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_static_correlation_heatmap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_correlation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_group_comparison",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_linear_regression",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rank_target_correlations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "patch_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_background_process",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "stop_background_process",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_background_processes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "http_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "find_in_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_shell_command",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "write_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_webpage",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_web",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot_webpage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arxiv_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "wikipedia",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "youtube_transcript",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot_webpages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_pdf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_tables_from_pdf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_docx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_excel_sheets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ocr_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "summarize_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_dataset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6c3560516e70befd47175942d85ad3699804a1b1353343af10941e428852c232",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 8,
"medium": 1,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}