Ds (ahmad-zurih) MCP Server
ds-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.3.4
Published by ahmad-zurih — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An MCP server exposing data science tools (plotting, stats, data exploration) to any LLM client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: fetch_webpage → github_read_file → http_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow fetch_webpage → github_read_file → http_request
high Tool "run_shell_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_shell_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_shell_command
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py:407`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt modules, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes." ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py:226`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt modules, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes." ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/server.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/server.py:44`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eges — imports, open(), eval(),", "!! subprocess, etc. are all allowed.", "!!", "!! A hostile da
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py:407`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: les, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes." ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_interactive.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py:226`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: les, call open()/eval()/exec(), or access dunder attributes." ) except SandboxTimeout as exc:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/plot_static.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: oduced by the LLM and `exec()` it in-process. Because the LLM's input can be influenced by any file, webpage, or datas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/sandbox.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r("~") result = subprocess.run( command, shell=True, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ds_mcp_server/_tools/system_tools.py
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "run_shell_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_shell_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_shell_command
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sandbox.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ('1+1')", "exec('x=1')", "compile('x','<s>','exec')", "open('/etc/passwd')",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_sandbox.py
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_webpageingests untrusted inputgithub_read_filereads sensitive datahttp_requestnetwork egressread_filereads sensitive datarun_background_processnetwork egressrun_shell_commandruns code / shellsearch_webingests untrusted inputwikipediaingests untrusted inputwrite_filewrites filesyoutube_transcriptingests untrusted input
Show 39 more tools ↓
arxiv_searchno sensitive capabilityextract_tables_from_pdfno sensitive capabilityfind_in_filesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_custom_plotlyno sensitive capabilitygenerate_custom_static_plotno sensitive capabilityget_all_columns_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_column_summaryno sensitive capabilitygithub_searchno sensitive capabilitylist_background_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilityocr_imageno sensitive capabilitypatch_fileno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_barchartno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_boxplotno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_correlation_heatmapno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_histogramno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_lineplotno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_scatter_matrixno sensitive capabilityplot_interactive_scatterplotno sensitive capabilityplot_static_barchartno sensitive capabilityplot_static_boxplotno sensitive capabilityplot_static_correlation_heatmapno sensitive capabilityplot_static_histogramno sensitive capabilityplot_static_lineplotno sensitive capabilityplot_static_pairplotno sensitive capabilityplot_static_scatterplotno sensitive capabilityplot_static_wordcloudno sensitive capabilityprofile_datasetno sensitive capabilityrank_target_correlationsno sensitive capabilityread_docxno sensitive capabilityread_excel_sheetsno sensitive capabilityread_pdfno sensitive capabilityrun_correlationno sensitive capabilityrun_group_comparisonno sensitive capabilityrun_linear_regressionno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_webpageno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_webpagesno sensitive capabilitystop_background_processno sensitive capabilitysummarize_documentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.4 latest |
B 89/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.3 |
B 89/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.3.0 |
B 89/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.2.2 |
B 89/100 | 17 | 1.7.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ds-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Ds 4
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