Mantisbt MCP Server
@dpesch/mantisbt-mcp-server
npm
v1.12.0
Published by @dpesch — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for MantisBT REST API – read and manage bug tracker issues
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_issue_files, sync_metadata]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file, create_issue]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_issue_files, sync_metadata] → sinks [upload_file, create_issue]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_issue_files → upload_file
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_issuenetwork egresslist_issue_filesingests untrusted inputsync_metadataingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressadd_monitorno sensitive capabilityadd_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_relationshipno sensitive capabilityattach_tagsno sensitive capabilitydelete_issueno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
detach_tagno sensitive capabilityfind_project_memberno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_issue_enumsno sensitive capabilityget_issue_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_mantis_versionno sensitive capabilityget_mcp_versionno sensitive capabilityget_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_metadata_fullno sensitive capabilityget_project_categoriesno sensitive capabilityget_project_usersno sensitive capabilityget_project_versionsno sensitive capabilityget_search_index_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_filtersno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_languagesno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilityrebuild_search_indexno sensitive capabilityremove_monitorno sensitive capabilityremove_relationshipno sensitive capabilitysearch_issuesno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.12.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.11.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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