Doris (apache) MCP Server
doris-mcp-server
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by apache — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Enterprise-grade Model Context Protocol (MCP) server implementation for Apache Doris
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "exec_query" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_query" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_query
high Tool "exec_adbc_query" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_adbc_query" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_adbc_query
low Mutating tool "exec_query" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_query" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_query
low Mutating tool "exec_adbc_query" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_adbc_query" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_adbc_query
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exec_adbc_queryruns code / shellexec_queryruns code / shellanalyze_columnsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_data_access_patternsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_data_flow_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityanalyze_resource_growth_curvesno sensitive capabilityanalyze_slow_queries_topnno sensitive capabilityanalyze_table_storageno sensitive capabilityget_adbc_connection_infono sensitive capabilityget_catalog_listno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
get_db_listno sensitive capabilityget_db_table_listno sensitive capabilityget_memory_statsno sensitive capabilityget_monitoring_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_recent_audit_logsno sensitive capabilityget_sql_explainno sensitive capabilityget_sql_profileno sensitive capabilityget_table_basic_infono sensitive capabilityget_table_column_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_table_commentno sensitive capabilityget_table_data_sizeno sensitive capabilityget_table_indexesno sensitive capabilityget_table_schemano sensitive capabilitymonitor_data_freshnessno sensitive capabilitytrace_column_lineageno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.6.1 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan doris-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Doris 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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