docdex
npm
v0.2.99
Source verified
Published by bekirdag — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Local-first documentation and code indexer with HTTP/MCP search, AST, and agent memory.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`bin/docdex.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = require("node:child_process"); const pkg = require("../package.json"); const { resolveDistBaseDir, resolveDis
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/docdex.js
In the server's implementation (`lib/cli_entry.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = require("node:child_process"); const pkg = require("../package.json"); const { resolveDistBaseDir, resolveDis
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/cli_entry.js
In the server's implementation (`lib/daemon_version.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = require("node:child_process"); const DEFAULT_VERSION_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 1500; function parseDocdexdVersion(o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/daemon_version.js
In the server's implementation (`lib/postinstall_setup.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require("node:child_process"); const { detectPlatformKey, UnsupportedPlatformError } = require("./platform");
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/postinstall_setup.js
In the server's implementation (`lib/uninstall.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require("node:child_process"); const { resolveDocdexDataDir } = require("./paths"); const DAEMON_TASK_NAME =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/uninstall.js
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`lib/install.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require("node:child_process"); const pkg = require("../package.json"); const { artifactName, assetPattern
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/install.js
"docdex" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node ./lib/install.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package docdex
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.99 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.2.98 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.2.95 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.2.94 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.2.92 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan docdex --online
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