Aigentry Deliberation — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "@dmsdc-ai/aigentry-deliberation",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@dmsdc-ai/aigentry-deliberation"
},
"server": {
"name": "@dmsdc-ai/aigentry-deliberation"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clipboard.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`clipboard.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "clipboard.js"
},
"evidence": "Sync, spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; function commandExistsInPath(command) { try { const isWin = process.platf",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "clipboard.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`doctor.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; const HOME = process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || \"\"; const IS_WIN =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "doctor.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const { fileURLToPath } = await import(\"node:url\"); const { dirname, join }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "index.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lib/speaker-discovery.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/speaker-discovery.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/speaker-discovery.js"
},
"evidence": "FileSync, spawn } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import os from \"os\"; import { TE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lib/speaker-discovery.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lib/telepty.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/telepty.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/telepty.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import os from \"os\"; import WebSoc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lib/telepty.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lib/transport.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/transport.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/transport.js"
},
"evidence": "FileSync, spawn } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import os from \"os\"; // ── Direct",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lib/transport.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (observer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`observer.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "observer.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const STATE_DIR",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "observer.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/telepty.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/telepty.js:621`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/telepty.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const res = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/api/bus/publish`, { method: \"POST\", headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "lib/telepty.js",
"line": 621,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (observer.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`observer.js:170`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "observer.js"
},
"evidence": "led(name) { try { execSync(`which ${name}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); return true; } catch { return false; } }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "observer.js",
"line": 170,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (install.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`install.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "install.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { fileURLToPath }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "install.js",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "deliberation_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_speaker_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_confirm_speakers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_list_active",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_browser_llm_tabs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_route_turn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_browser_auto_turn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_cli_auto_turn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_run_until_blocked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_respond",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_ingest_remote_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_list_remote_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_inject_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_copy_last_turn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_synthesize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_set_execution_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_cli_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deliberation_request_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_respond",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a761021118e246966f2a1235ec35a63be549e29d2874964460a4cabd90fe5fc0",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}