Aigentry Deliberation MCP Server
@dmsdc-ai/aigentry-deliberation
npm
v0.0.47
Published by @dmsdc-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (clipboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`clipboard.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Sync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; function commandExistsInPath(command) { try { const isWin = process.platf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server clipboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`doctor.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; const HOME = process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || ""; const IS_WIN =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const { fileURLToPath } = await import("node:url"); const { dirname, join }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/speaker-discovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/speaker-discovery.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: FileSync, spawn } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import os from "os"; import { TE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/speaker-discovery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/telepty.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/telepty.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import os from "os"; import WebSoc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/telepty.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/transport.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/transport.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: FileSync, spawn } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import os from "os"; // ── Direct
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/transport.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (observer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`observer.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const STATE_DIR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server observer.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/telepty.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`lib/telepty.js:621`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/api/bus/publish`, { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/telepty.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (observer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`observer.js:170`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: led(name) { try { execSync(`which ${name}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); return true; } catch { return false; } }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server observer.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`install.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server install.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
decision_historyno sensitive capabilitydecision_respondno sensitive capabilitydecision_resumeno sensitive capabilitydecision_startno sensitive capabilitydecision_statusno sensitive capabilitydecision_templatesno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_browser_auto_turnno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_browser_llm_tabsno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_cli_auto_turnno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_cli_configno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
deliberation_confirm_speakersno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_contextno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_copy_last_turnno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_historyno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_ingest_remote_replyno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_inject_contextno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_listno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_list_activeno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_list_remote_sessionsno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_request_reviewno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_resetno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_respondno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_route_turnno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_run_until_blockedno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_set_execution_statusno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_speaker_candidatesno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_startno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_statusno sensitive capabilitydeliberation_synthesizeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.47 latest |
B 87/100 | 10 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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