Devsmind — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "devsmind-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "devsmind-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "devsmind-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/init.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const prompts_1 = __importDefault(require(\"prompts\")",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/init.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/view.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/view.js:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/view.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const server_1 = require(\"../mcp/server\"); /** * Wa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/view.js",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/git.js"
},
"evidence": "hangedFilesSince; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); /** Files renamed (via `git log`'s rename detection)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/git.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"devmind_path\" on \"workflow_read_artifact\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"workflow_read_artifact\" takes a path parameter \"devmind_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "workflow_read_artifact",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.devmind_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "devmind_path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_node_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_node_code",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "index_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_checkpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_continue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_complete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stage_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "commit_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recheck_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_node_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_node_graph",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deprecate_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_developer_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_changes_by_requirement",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_orphaned_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_visualizer_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_add_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_pause",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_add_artifact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_sync_retroactive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_read_artifact",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_get_steps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cda090506303f48ddea324900f1301a26d400d8bf7c066edc99643caed33f95c",
"stats": {
"tools": 35,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}