Devsmind MCP Server
devsmind-mcp
npm
v4.4.0
Published by abialidr — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
DevsMind — Team AI Brain
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const prompts_1 = __importDefault(require("prompts")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/view.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/view.js:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const server_1 = require("../mcp/server"); const con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/view.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/devsmind-branch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/devsmind-branch.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: airBrainTracking; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const crypto = __importStar(require("crypto")); cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/devsmind-branch.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: hangedFilesSince; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); /** Files renamed (via `git log`'s rename detection)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/git.js
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_descriptionno sensitive capabilityadd_feedbackno sensitive capabilityadd_repono sensitive capabilityanalyze_graphno sensitive capabilitycommit_changesno sensitive capabilitycreate_missing_nodeno sensitive capabilitydeprecate_nodeno sensitive capabilitydevsmind_git_syncno sensitive capabilityedit_nodeno sensitive capabilityflag_indexer_ruleno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
get_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_node_codeno sensitive capabilityget_visualizer_urlno sensitive capabilityindex_checkpointno sensitive capabilityindex_completeno sensitive capabilityindex_continueno sensitive capabilityindex_startno sensitive capabilitylink_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_nodesno sensitive capabilitymark_graph_feedback_processedno sensitive capabilitymerge_nodesno sensitive capabilityread_graph_feedbackno sensitive capabilityrecheck_graphno sensitive capabilityrecord_aliasno sensitive capabilityrename_nodeno sensitive capabilitysearch_nodesno sensitive capabilitysplit_nodeno sensitive capabilitystage_changeno sensitive capabilitystart_sessionno sensitive capabilityworkflow_add_stepno sensitive capabilityworkflow_archiveno sensitive capabilityworkflow_bindno sensitive capabilityworkflow_createno sensitive capabilityworkflow_deleteno sensitive capabilityworkflow_get_contextno sensitive capabilityworkflow_importno sensitive capabilityworkflow_listno sensitive capabilityworkflow_remove_stepno sensitive capabilityworkflow_syncno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.4.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v4.3.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v4.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v4.1.1 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v4.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v4.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v3.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v2.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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