Deploycheck — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (detectors/securityDetector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`detectors/securityDetector.js:183`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "detectors/securityDetector.js"
},
"evidence": "suggestedFix: \"Remove eval() usage. Use JSON.parse() or local logic alternatives to avoid remote code executions.\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "detectors/securityDetector.js",
"line": 183,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (utils/testPhase12.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`utils/testPhase12.js:36`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "utils/testPhase12.js"
},
"evidence": "st app = express(); eval(\"console.log('dangerous')\"); app.listen(3000); `, \"utf8\" ); // 3. Dockerfile",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "utils/testPhase12.js",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (utils/testPhase4.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`utils/testPhase4.js:80`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "utils/testPhase4.js"
},
"evidence": "// Eval usage eval(\"console.log('dangerous')\"); // SQL Injection risk app.get('/user', (req, res)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "utils/testPhase4.js",
"line": 80,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (deployers/netlifyDeployer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`deployers/netlifyDeployer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "deployers/netlifyDeployer.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } = require(\"child_process\"); const logger = require(\"../utils/logger.js\"); function isNetlifyCliAvailable()",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "deployers/netlifyDeployer.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (deployers/railwayDeployer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`deployers/railwayDeployer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "deployers/railwayDeployer.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } = require(\"child_process\"); const logger = require(\"../utils/logger.js\"); function isRailwayCliAvailable()",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "deployers/railwayDeployer.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (deployers/vercelDeployer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`deployers/vercelDeployer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "deployers/vercelDeployer.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const path = require(\"path\"); const logger = require(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "deployers/vercelDeployer.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (detectors/depDetector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`detectors/depDetector.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "detectors/depDetector.js"
},
"evidence": "_hooks\", \"buffer\", \"child_process\", \"cluster\", \"console\", \"constants\", \"crypto\", \"dgram\", \"dns\", \"doma",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "detectors/depDetector.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (detectors/pythonAstEngine.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`detectors/pythonAstEngine.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "detectors/pythonAstEngine.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const path = require(\"path\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); let cachedPythonCmd =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "detectors/pythonAstEngine.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (utils/logAnalyzer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`utils/logAnalyzer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "utils/logAnalyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const path = require(\"path\"); // Load external signa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "utils/logAnalyzer.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (detectors/pythonAstEngine.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`detectors/pythonAstEngine.js:65`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "detectors/pythonAstEngine.js"
},
"evidence": "aces const stdout = execSync(`\"${pythonCmd}\" \"${parserPath}\" \"${filePath}\"`, { encoding: \"utf8\", maxBuff",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "detectors/pythonAstEngine.js",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (utils/logAnalyzer.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`utils/logAnalyzer.js:27`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "utils/logAnalyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "e diff const diff = execSync(`git diff HEAD~${commits} HEAD --unified=0`, { cwd: repoPath, encoding: \"utf8\" });",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "utils/logAnalyzer.js",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "audit_and_fix_codebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rollback_to_stable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reconcile_environment_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_deploy_failure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_live_environment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_compliance_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "986903e3371cc33714158bc4079fa1bf49531cc8cfd90d68bc33ba85ec36a412",
"stats": {
"tools": 7,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 2
}
}
}