Deploycheck MCP Server
@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp
npm
v0.1.5
Published by @deploycheck — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −23.1 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value ×2 MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
| −22 | Hardcoded Slack token in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −15.4 | Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server MTC-SRC-011 | injection |
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
Grade capped: 1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 17
high Hardcoded Slack token in server code (utils/testPhase3.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Slack token is hardcoded in `utils/testPhase3.js:74`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Slack token: xoxb…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server utils/testPhase3.js
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (detectors/securityDetector.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`detectors/securityDetector.js:181`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server detectors/securityDetector.js
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (utils/testPhase12.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`utils/testPhase12.js:30`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils/testPhase12.js
high Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same serverMTC-SRC-011
The implementation builds shell commands out of runtime values AND evaluates runtime values as code. Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code.
Fix: Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.
Location: server implementation
high Dynamic code execution in server code (detectors/securityDetector.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`detectors/securityDetector.js:171`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server detectors/securityDetector.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (scoring/complianceEngine.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`scoring/complianceEngine.js:76`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scoring/complianceEngine.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (utils/testPhase12.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`utils/testPhase12.js:30`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils/testPhase12.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (utils/testPhase4.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`utils/testPhase4.js:80`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils/testPhase4.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (deployers/netlifyDeployer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`deployers/netlifyDeployer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server deployers/netlifyDeployer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (deployers/railwayDeployer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`deployers/railwayDeployer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server deployers/railwayDeployer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (deployers/vercelDeployer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`deployers/vercelDeployer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server deployers/vercelDeployer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (detectors/depDetector.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`detectors/depDetector.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server detectors/depDetector.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (detectors/pythonAstEngine.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`detectors/pythonAstEngine.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server detectors/pythonAstEngine.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (utils/logAnalyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`utils/logAnalyzer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils/logAnalyzer.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (detectors/pythonAstEngine.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`detectors/pythonAstEngine.js:65`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`"${pythonCmd}" "${parserPath}" "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server detectors/pythonAstEngine.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (utils/logAnalyzer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`utils/logAnalyzer.js:27`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`git diff HEAD~${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils/logAnalyzer.js
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"@deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package @deploycheck/deploycheck-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5 latest |
F 28/100 | 17 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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