Tellymcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@deadragdoll/tellymcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@deadragdoll/tellymcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@deadragdoll/tellymcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js:24`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js"
},
"evidence": ".dockerconfigjson\", \".git-credentials\", \".netrc\", \".npmrc\", \".pypirc\", \".yarnrc\", \".yarnrc.yml\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "ode:path\")); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_crypto_1 = require(\"node:crypto\"); c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/codexPluginInstaller.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/codexPluginInstaller.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/codexPluginInstaller.js"
},
"evidence": "ode:path\")); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const PLUGIN_NAME = \"telly-workflows\"; const MA",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/codexPluginInstaller.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/configureServer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/configureServer.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/configureServer.js"
},
"evidence": "de:crypto\"); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const dotenv_1 = require(\"dotenv\"); const iored",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/configureServer.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/configureServer.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/configureServer.js:617`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/configureServer.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/getMe`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/configureServer.js",
"line": 617,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js:211`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(exports.TELLYMCP_PACKAGE_NAME)}/latest`,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js",
"line": 211,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/postinstall.js"
},
"evidence": "nSync } = require(\"node:child_process\"); const pc = require(\"picocolors\"); function hasCodex() { const result = spawn",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/postinstall.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@deadragdoll/tellymcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@deadragdoll/tellymcp"
},
"evidence": "node ./scripts/postinstall.js",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ask_user_telegram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_attach_active_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_attach_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_clear_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_computed_style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_detach_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_dom",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_errors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_fill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_inject_script",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_list_attached_instances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_list_tabs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_network_failures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_recording_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_recording_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_recording_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_reload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_wait_for",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_wait_for_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_gateway_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_partner_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_partner_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "notify_telegram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_file_to_telegram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_session_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_runtime_diagnostics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_session_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_tools_markdown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_xchange_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_xchange_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_xchange_record_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b12ece58c3f1301c8027e55aeaff1eed6f33682728583f1cb0bba08ed73779f9",
"stats": {
"tools": 41,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}