Tellymcp MCP Server
@deadragdoll/tellymcp
npm
v0.0.16
Published by @deadragdoll — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
TellyMCP - Telegram control plane for MCP-connected coding agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js:24`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .dockerconfigjson", ".git-credentials", ".netrc", ".npmrc", ".pypirc", ".yarnrc", ".yarnrc.yml",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto"); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/codexPluginInstaller.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/codexPluginInstaller.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const PLUGIN_NAME = "telly-workflows"; const MA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/codexPluginInstaller.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/configureServer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/configureServer.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: de:crypto"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const dotenv_1 = require("dotenv"); const iored
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/configureServer.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/configureServer.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/configureServer.js:617`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/getMe`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/configureServer.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js:211`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(exports.TELLYMCP_PACKAGE_NAME)}/latest`,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require("node:child_process"); const pc = require("picocolors"); function hasCodex() { const result = spawn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@deadragdoll/tellymcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node ./scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @deadragdoll/tellymcp
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_fileingests untrusted inputask_user_telegramno sensitive capabilitybrowser_attach_active_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_attach_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clear_logsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_computed_styleno sensitive capabilitybrowser_consoleno sensitive capabilitybrowser_detach_tabno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
browser_domno sensitive capabilitybrowser_errorsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fillno sensitive capabilitybrowser_inject_scriptno sensitive capabilitybrowser_list_attached_instancesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_list_tabsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_network_failuresno sensitive capabilitybrowser_openno sensitive capabilitybrowser_pressno sensitive capabilitybrowser_recording_startno sensitive capabilitybrowser_recording_statusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_recording_stopno sensitive capabilitybrowser_reloadno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_forno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_urlno sensitive capabilityclear_session_contextno sensitive capabilityget_file_listno sensitive capabilityget_runtime_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityget_session_contextno sensitive capabilityget_xchange_recordno sensitive capabilitylist_gateway_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_xchange_recordsno sensitive capabilitymark_xchange_record_readno sensitive capabilitynotify_telegramno sensitive capabilityrefresh_tools_markdownno sensitive capabilityrename_sessionno sensitive capabilitysend_file_to_telegramno sensitive capabilitysend_partner_fileno sensitive capabilitysend_partner_noteno sensitive capabilityset_session_contextno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.16 latest |
A 92/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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