Tellymcp MCP Server
@deadragdoll/tellymcp
npm
v0.0.16
Published by @deadragdoll — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 8
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js:25`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .netrc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/features/file-content/model/workspaceFilePolicy.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/codexPluginInstaller.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/codexPluginInstaller.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/codexPluginInstaller.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/configureServer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/configureServer.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/configureServer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/postinstall.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/configureServer.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/configureServer.js:617`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/getMe`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/configureServer.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js:211`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(exports.TELLYMCP_PACKAGE_NAME)}/latest`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/features/telegram-mcp/src/shared/lib/version/versionHandshake.js
medium Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@deadragdoll/tellymcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @deadragdoll/tellymcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.16 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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