Davoxi — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@davoxi/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@davoxi/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@davoxi/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"file-write",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/auth/browser-login.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/auth/browser-login.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/auth/browser-login.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; const DEFAULT_DASHBOARD_URL = \"https://app.davoxi.com\"; const LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/auth/browser-login.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([list_invoices]) co-exist with external-action tools ([update_business, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_invoices → update_business"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [list_invoices] → sinks [update_business, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"list_invoices"
],
"sinks": [
"update_business",
"create_webhook",
"update_webhook",
"delete_webhook"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/auth/browser-login.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/auth/browser-login.js:21`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/auth/browser-login.js"
},
"evidence": "arwin\": execSync(`open \"${url}\"`, { stdio: \"ignore\" }); break; case \"win32\":",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/src/auth/browser-login.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"unlink_caller_service\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_caller_service\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_caller_service"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"unlink_caller_service\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_caller_service\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_caller_service"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js"
},
"evidence": "ser-login.js\"; vi.mock(\"child_process\", () => ({ execSync: vi.fn() })); // ---------------------------------------------",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"list_invoices"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"update_business",
"create_webhook",
"update_webhook",
"delete_webhook"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_api_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "duplicate_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_usage_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_subscription",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_invoices",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_businesses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_business",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_business",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_business",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"put_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "set_business_hours",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pause_business",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resume_business",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_business",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_access_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_caller_to_allowlist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_caller_to_blocklist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_caller_rate_limit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_caller_force_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_blocked_callers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_caller_access_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_callers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_caller",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_caller_services",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlink_caller_service",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_call_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_call_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tool_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_tool_credential",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_org",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_org",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_phone_numbers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_agent_chat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attach_tool_to_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detach_tool_from_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agent_tool_refs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_webhooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "39bf5960e0798058a0aea97136491dd78d0d98c82d1ca7f5bab2d4adaa649a59",
"stats": {
"tools": 53,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 3,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}