Davoxi MCP Server
@davoxi/mcp-server
npm
v1.7.0
Source verified
Published by mabrokamedia — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for the Davoxi AI voice agent platform — manage businesses, agents, usage, and billing via AI assistants.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/auth/browser-login.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/auth/browser-login.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; const DEFAULT_DASHBOARD_URL = "https://app.davoxi.com"; const LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/auth/browser-login.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_invoices]) co-exist with external-action tools ([update_business, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_invoices] → sinks [update_business, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_invoices → update_business
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/auth/browser-login.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/auth/browser-login.js:21`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: arwin": execSync(`open "${url}"`, { stdio: "ignore" }); break; case "win32":
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/auth/browser-login.js
medium Tool "unlink_caller_service" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_caller_service" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_caller_service
low Mutating tool "unlink_caller_service" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_caller_service" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_caller_service
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ser-login.js"; vi.mock("child_process", () => ({ execSync: vi.fn() })); // ---------------------------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/__tests__/browser-login.test.js
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egresslist_invoicesingests untrusted inputunlink_caller_servicewrites filesupdate_businessnetwork egressupdate_webhooknetwork egressadd_caller_to_allowlistno sensitive capabilityadd_caller_to_blocklistno sensitive capabilityattach_tool_to_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
create_api_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_businessno sensitive capabilitycreate_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_businessno sensitive capabilitydelete_toolno sensitive capabilitydetach_tool_from_agentno sensitive capabilityduplicate_agentno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_businessno sensitive capabilityget_call_logno sensitive capabilityget_callerno sensitive capabilityget_caller_access_auditno sensitive capabilityget_orgno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityget_toolno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilityget_usage_summaryno sensitive capabilitylist_agent_tool_refsno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_api_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_blocked_callersno sensitive capabilitylist_businessesno sensitive capabilitylist_call_logsno sensitive capabilitylist_caller_servicesno sensitive capabilitylist_callersno sensitive capabilitylist_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilitylist_tool_credentialsno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitypause_businessno sensitive capabilityresume_businessno sensitive capabilityrevoke_api_keyno sensitive capabilityset_access_policyno sensitive capabilityset_business_hoursno sensitive capabilityset_caller_force_modeno sensitive capabilityset_caller_rate_limitno sensitive capabilityset_tool_credentialno sensitive capabilitytest_agent_chatno sensitive capabilityupdate_agentno sensitive capabilityupdate_orgno sensitive capabilityupdate_toolno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.0 latest |
B 84/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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