Dart Risk — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "dart-risk-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "dart-risk-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "dart-risk-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (api/[endpoint].js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`api/[endpoint].js:52`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "api/[endpoint].js"
},
"evidence": "const upstream = await fetch( `https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/${endpoint}?${usp}`, { headers: { Accept: \"ap",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "api/[endpoint].js",
"line": 52,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/propose_release.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/propose_release.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/propose_release.py"
},
"evidence": "str) -> str: return subprocess.run([\"git\", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, encodin",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/propose_release.py",
"line": 81,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py"
},
"evidence": "try: raw = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"show\", f\"{_SEED_FALLBACK_COMMIT}:dart_risk_mcp/data/known_a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py",
"line": 97,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py"
},
"evidence": "() try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which(\"node\"), tf.name], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py",
"line": 91,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_catalog_packaging.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_catalog_packaging.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_catalog_packaging.py"
},
"evidence": "bool: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"check-ignore\", \"-q\", relpath], cwd=_ROOT, captu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_catalog_packaging.py",
"line": 47,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_changelog_continuity.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_changelog_continuity.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_changelog_continuity.py"
},
"evidence": "서 버전을 뽑는다.\"\"\" out = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"log\", \"--format=%s\", \"--grep=chore(release): v\"], cwd=_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_changelog_continuity.py",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_control_change_parity.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_control_change_parity.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_control_change_parity.py"
},
"evidence": "() try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which(\"node\"), tf.name], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_control_change_parity.py",
"line": 107,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py"
},
"evidence": "() try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which(\"node\"), tf.name], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py",
"line": 134,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py"
},
"evidence": "() try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which(\"node\"), tf.name], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py",
"line": 83,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py"
},
"evidence": "esolve().parents[1] subprocess.run([sys.executable, \"-m\", \"scripts.merge_sightings_files\", str(o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_routine_filing_category.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_routine_filing_category.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_routine_filing_category.py"
},
"evidence": "False)})));\") out = subprocess.run([_NODE, \"-e\", script], capture_output=True, text=True, e",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_routine_filing_category.py",
"line": 47,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "analyze_company_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_disclosure_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_risk_precedents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_event_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_known_actor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_watchlist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_actor_overlap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_disclosures_by_stock",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_disclosure_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_disclosure_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "view_disclosure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_company_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_financial_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_financials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_shareholder_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_affiliate_investments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_market_disclosures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_executive_compensation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_insider_trading",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_audit_opinion_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_debt_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_disclosure_anomaly",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_fund_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_major_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_financial_anomaly",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_capital_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_turnover_trend",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c8d83d93c57a0f3e941da09508770c8bfa9f8be6c418bb3125a84fc4cfbdd029",
"stats": {
"tools": 27,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 10,
"info": 0
}
}
}