Dart Risk MCP Server
dart-risk-mcp
PyPI
v1.22.1
Published by anboyu-alt — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
DART 공시 기반 한국 기업 주가조작 위험 분석 MCP 서버
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (api/[endpoint].js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`api/[endpoint].js:52`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const upstream = await fetch( `https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/${endpoint}?${usp}`, { headers: { Accept: "ap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server api/[endpoint].js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/propose_release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/propose_release.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: str) -> str: return subprocess.run(["git", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, encodin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/propose_release.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: raw = subprocess.run( ["git", "show", f"{_SEED_FALLBACK_COMMIT}:dart_risk_mcp/data/known_a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup_known_actors_db.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: () try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which("node"), tf.name], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_acquisition_parser_parity.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_catalog_packaging.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_catalog_packaging.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bool: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "check-ignore", "-q", relpath], cwd=_ROOT, captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_catalog_packaging.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_changelog_continuity.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_changelog_continuity.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 서 버전을 뽑는다.""" out = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", "--format=%s", "--grep=chore(release): v"], cwd=_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_changelog_continuity.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_control_change_parity.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_control_change_parity.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: () try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which("node"), tf.name], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_control_change_parity.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: () try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which("node"), tf.name], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_fund_usage_blank_fields.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: () try: r = subprocess.run([shutil.which("node"), tf.name], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_heavy_signal_gate.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: esolve().parents[1] subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "scripts.merge_sightings_files", str(o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_merge_sightings_files.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_routine_filing_category.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_routine_filing_category.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: False)})));") out = subprocess.run([_NODE, "-e", script], capture_output=True, text=True, e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_routine_filing_category.py
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_company_riskno sensitive capabilitybuild_event_timelineno sensitive capabilitycheck_disclosure_anomalyno sensitive capabilitycheck_disclosure_riskno sensitive capabilitycompare_financialsno sensitive capabilityfind_actor_overlapno sensitive capabilityfind_risk_precedentsno sensitive capabilityget_affiliate_investmentsno sensitive capabilityget_audit_opinion_historyno sensitive capabilityget_company_infono sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
get_disclosure_documentno sensitive capabilityget_executive_compensationno sensitive capabilityget_financial_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_major_decisionno sensitive capabilityget_shareholder_infono sensitive capabilitylist_disclosure_sectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_disclosures_by_stockno sensitive capabilitylookup_known_actorno sensitive capabilitymanage_watchlistno sensitive capabilityscan_financial_anomalyno sensitive capabilitysearch_market_disclosuresno sensitive capabilitytrack_capital_structureno sensitive capabilitytrack_debt_balanceno sensitive capabilitytrack_fund_usageno sensitive capabilitytrack_insider_tradingno sensitive capabilitytrack_turnover_trendno sensitive capabilityview_disclosureno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.22.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.21.23 |
A 96/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.12.0 |
A 95/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.11.0 |
A 95/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v1.10.3 |
A 95/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v1.6.0 |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan dart-risk-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Finance & Commerce
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