Spotify (darrenjaws) MCP Server
@darrenjaws/spotify-mcp
npm
v1.2.4
Source verified
Published by darrenjaworski — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Model Context Protocol server for Spotify integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/spotify/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/spotify/auth.js:253`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import("child_process").then(({ spawn }) => { const platform = process.platform;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/spotify/auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/playback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/playback.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { getAuthenticatedClient } from "../spotify/client.js"; import { handleTo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/playback.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/system.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/system.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { logger } from "../utils/logger.js"; import { getAuthenticatedClient } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/system.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/setup.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { writeFile } from "fs/promises"; import { homedir } from "os"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/setup.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
spotify_add_to_playlistno sensitive capabilityspotify_create_playlistno sensitive capabilityspotify_delete_playlistno sensitive capabilityspotify_follow_artistsno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_devicesno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_followed_artistsno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_playback_stateno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_playlistno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_playlistsno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_recently_playedno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
spotify_get_saved_albumsno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_saved_tracksno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_top_itemsno sensitive capabilityspotify_get_user_profileno sensitive capabilityspotify_nextno sensitive capabilityspotify_openno sensitive capabilityspotify_pauseno sensitive capabilityspotify_playno sensitive capabilityspotify_previousno sensitive capabilityspotify_remove_from_playlistno sensitive capabilityspotify_remove_saved_albumsno sensitive capabilityspotify_remove_saved_tracksno sensitive capabilityspotify_reorder_playlist_tracksno sensitive capabilityspotify_repeatno sensitive capabilityspotify_save_albumsno sensitive capabilityspotify_save_tracksno sensitive capabilityspotify_searchno sensitive capabilityspotify_set_volumeno sensitive capabilityspotify_shuffleno sensitive capabilityspotify_transfer_playbackno sensitive capabilityspotify_unfollow_artistsno sensitive capabilityspotify_update_playlistno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.4 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @darrenjaws/spotify-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Spotify 8
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 9 side by side →
Model Context Protocol server for Spotify integration
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