Spotify (calebWei) MCP Server
spotify-mcp
npm
v0.1.4
Published by calebwei — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Spotify Web API — use Claude to manage playlists, control playback, and get recommendations
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:126`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const tokenRes = await fetch('https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/client.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/client.js:48`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token', { method: 'POST', header
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_to_playlistno sensitive capabilityadd_to_queueno sensitive capabilitycheck_following_artistsno sensitive capabilitycheck_saved_itemsno sensitive capabilitycreate_playlistno sensitive capabilityfollow_artistno sensitive capabilityget_albumno sensitive capabilityget_artistno sensitive capabilityget_artist_albumsno sensitive capabilityget_audio_analysisno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
get_audio_featuresno sensitive capabilityget_available_genresno sensitive capabilityget_devicesno sensitive capabilityget_episodeno sensitive capabilityget_featured_playlistsno sensitive capabilityget_followed_artistsno sensitive capabilityget_now_playingno sensitive capabilityget_playlistno sensitive capabilityget_queueno sensitive capabilityget_recently_playedno sensitive capabilityget_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityget_related_artistsno sensitive capabilityget_saved_albumsno sensitive capabilityget_saved_episodesno sensitive capabilityget_saved_showsno sensitive capabilityget_saved_tracksno sensitive capabilityget_showno sensitive capabilityget_top_artistsno sensitive capabilityget_top_tracksno sensitive capabilityget_trackno sensitive capabilityget_user_playlistsno sensitive capabilitypauseno sensitive capabilityplayno sensitive capabilityremove_from_playlistno sensitive capabilityremove_saved_itemsno sensitive capabilityreorder_playlist_itemsno sensitive capabilitysave_itemsno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityseekno sensitive capabilityset_repeatno sensitive capabilityset_shuffleno sensitive capabilityset_volumeno sensitive capabilityskip_nextno sensitive capabilityskip_previousno sensitive capabilitytransfer_playbackno sensitive capabilityunfollow_artistno sensitive capabilityupdate_playlistno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan spotify-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Spotify 8
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 9 side by side →
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Spotify Web API MCP server for accessing music, artists, albums, and recommendations
MCP server for Spotify playlist building and playback control
Spotify MCP Server for Claude and other AI assistants
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