Crosspad — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "crosspad-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "crosspad-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "crosspad-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hil/daemon.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/hil/daemon.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/hil/daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { resolveConfigValue } from \"../utils/userConfig.js\"; import { resolvedPy",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/hil/daemon.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/app-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/app-manager.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/app-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; /** @internal exported for testing */ export function getAvailablePlatforms() {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/app-manager.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/idf-monitor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/idf-monitor.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/idf-monitor.js"
},
"evidence": "pawn, spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; /** * Best-effort check: is some other process already holding this serial port",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/idf-monitor.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/stm-flash.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/stm-flash.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/stm-flash.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; import { CROSSPAD_STM_ROOT, stmArtifact, STM_FLASH_ADDR, IS_WINDOWS } from \"../c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/stm-flash.js",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/trace-session.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/trace-session.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/trace-session.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import { TraceBuffer } from \"./tra",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/trace-session.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/trace-webui.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/trace-webui.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/trace-webui.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"url\"; import { WebSocketServer } from \"ws\"; impor",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/trace-webui.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/clangd.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/clangd.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/clangd.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import os from \"node:os\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/clangd.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/device.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/device.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/device.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import { IS_WINDOWS, IS_MAC } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/device.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/exec.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync, spawn } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import { VCVARSALL, IS_WINDOWS, ID",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/exec.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/device.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/device.js:48`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/device.js"
},
"evidence": "const output = execSync(`python3 -c \"${script}\"`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", timeout: 10_000,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/utils/device.js",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/registry.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/registry.js:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/registry.js"
},
"evidence": "mod = (await import(spec.module)); } catch (e) { if (!isMissingModule(e, spec.mod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/registry.js",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/build.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/build.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/build.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; import { CROSSPAD_PC_ROOT, BUILD_DIR, BIN_EXE, VCPKG_TOOLCHAIN } from \"../config",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/build.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "4cbce615c664b4c11ff2b8c5ffbdb5950a6df02cae0c2b0e0858da131a4f9040",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}