Crosspad MCP Server
crosspad-mcp-server
npm
v9.2.0
Source verified
Published by crosspad — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/app-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/app-manager.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; /** @internal exported for testing */ export function getAvailablePlatforms() {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/app-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/idf-monitor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/idf-monitor.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, spawnSync } from "child_process"; /** * Best-effort check: is some other process already holding this serial port
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/idf-monitor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/repo-actions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/repo-actions.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; /** * Run git in argv mode (no shell). Use for any git invocation that takes *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/repo-actions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/stm-flash.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/stm-flash.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { CROSSPAD_STM_ROOT, stmArtifact, STM_FLASH_ADDR, IS_WINDOWS } from "../c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/stm-flash.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/trace-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/trace-session.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; import { TraceBuffer } from "./tra
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/trace-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/trace-webui.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/trace-webui.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; import { WebSocketServer } from "ws"; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/trace-webui.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/device.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/device.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import { IS_WINDOWS, IS_MAC } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/device.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import { VCVARSALL, IS_WINDOWS, IDF_PATH } from "../config.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/exec.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/device.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/device.js:48`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`python3 -c "${script}"`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10_000,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/device.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/build.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { CROSSPAD_PC_ROOT, BUILD_DIR, BIN_EXE, VCPKG_TOOLCHAIN } from "../config
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
crosspad_submodule_updateingests untrusted inputcrosspad_apps_installno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_apps_listno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_apps_removeno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_apps_syncno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_apps_updateno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_buildno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_checkno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_commitno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
crosspad_devicesno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_flashno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_inputno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_interface_implementationsno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_killno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_list_apps_sourceno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_list_interfacesno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_logno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_midino sensitive capabilitycrosspad_repo_diffno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_repo_statusno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_runno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_screenshotno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_search_symbolsno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_settings_getno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_settings_setno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_statsno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_test_runno sensitive capabilitycrosspad_traceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v9.2.0 latest |
B 84/100 | 10 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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