Cortex (syab726) MCP Server
cortex-mcp
PyPI
v1.1.20
Published by syab726 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Making AI Accountable Over Time - MCP server for persistent memory, automatic verification, and evidence-based grounding
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (cortex_mcp/hooks/validate_boundary.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/hooks/validate_boundary.py:29`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r"\.gitconfig", r"id_rsa", r"id_ed25519", r"\.npmrc", r"\.pypirc", ] # 위험 명령어 패턴 DANGEROUS_COMMANDS =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/hooks/validate_boundary.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/auto_verifier.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/auto_verifier.py:758`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "] result = subprocess.run( git_diff_cmd, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/auto_verifier.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/claim_verifier.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/claim_verifier.py:681`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=self.project_path,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/claim_verifier.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/evidence_collector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/evidence_collector.py:273`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["git"] + args, cwd=self.project_path,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/evidence_collector.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/git_sync.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/git_sync.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 오기 result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], cw
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/git_sync.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/license_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/license_manager.py:358`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["sysctl", "-n", "machdep.cpu.brand_string"], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/license_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/memory/context_loader.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/memory/context_loader.py:279`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "branch", "--show-current"], cwd
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/memory/context_loader.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/memory_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/memory_manager.py:833`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run( ["git", "--version"], check=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/memory_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/project_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/project_config.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 오기 result = subprocess.run( ["git", "remote", "get-url", "origin"], cwd=self
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/project_config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/team_merge.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/team_merge.py:117`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 확인 result = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", "-1", "--pretty=%P"], cwd=repo_pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/team_merge.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cortex_mcp/core/verifiers/file_change_verifier.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/core/verifiers/file_change_verifier.py:263`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e] result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=project_path, capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/core/verifiers/file_change_verifier.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (cortex_mcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/cli.py:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( "https://pypi.org/pypi/cortex-mcp/json", timeout=5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/cli.py
medium Tool "unlink_git_branch" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_git_branch" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_git_branch
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (cortex_mcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`cortex_mcp/cli.py:154`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(module) print(f" [PASS] {name}") except ImportError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/cli.py
low Mutating tool "unlink_git_branch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_git_branch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_git_branch
low Unconstrained path parameter "repo_path" on "unlink_git_branch"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "unlink_git_branch" takes a path parameter "repo_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool unlink_git_branch · inputSchema.properties.repo_path
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (cortex_mcp/scripts/verify_installation.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`cortex_mcp/scripts/verify_installation.py:133`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : mod = __import__(import_name) ver = getattr(mod, "__version__", "unknown")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cortex_mcp/scripts/verify_installation.py
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
unlink_git_branchwrites filesaccept_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityadd_semantic_relationno sensitive capabilitycheck_git_branch_changeno sensitive capabilityclear_boundaryno sensitive capabilitycompress_contextno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydetect_conflictsno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
get_active_sessionsno sensitive capabilityget_active_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_automation_statusno sensitive capabilityget_backup_historyno sensitive capabilityget_boundary_protocolno sensitive capabilityget_boundary_violationsno sensitive capabilityget_context_graph_infono sensitive capabilityget_dashboard_urlno sensitive capabilityget_git_statusno sensitive capabilityget_hierarchyno sensitive capabilityget_loaded_contextsno sensitive capabilityget_reference_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_scan_estimateno sensitive capabilityget_semantic_web_statsno sensitive capabilityinfer_boundaryno sensitive capabilityinfer_relationsno sensitive capabilityinitialize_contextno sensitive capabilitylink_git_branchno sensitive capabilitylist_git_linksno sensitive capabilitylist_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_snapshotsno sensitive capabilityload_contextno sensitive capabilityrecord_automation_feedbackno sensitive capabilityrecord_referenceno sensitive capabilityreject_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityrescan_projectno sensitive capabilityresolve_contextno sensitive capabilityrestore_snapshotno sensitive capabilityscan_project_deepno sensitive capabilitysearch_contextno sensitive capabilityset_automation_modeno sensitive capabilityset_boundaryno sensitive capabilityshould_confirm_actionno sensitive capabilitysuggest_contextsno sensitive capabilitysuggest_node_groupingno sensitive capabilitysuggest_related_contextsno sensitive capabilitysync_from_cloudno sensitive capabilitysync_parallel_sessionsno sensitive capabilitysync_to_cloudno sensitive capabilityupdate_memoryno sensitive capabilityupdate_reference_feedbackno sensitive capabilityvalidate_boundary_actionno sensitive capabilityverify_responseno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.20 latest |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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