@copperbox/okf-mcp
npm
v2.0.0
Source verified
Published by copperbox — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
An MCP server providing an Open Knowledge Format (OKF) backend in a standardized way to coding agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git.js
Tool "load_remote_bundle" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool load_remote_bundle · inputSchema.properties.url
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
load_remote_bundleingests untrusted inputappend_log_entryno sensitive capabilityconcept_diffno sensitive capabilityconcept_historyno sensitive capabilitydelete_conceptno sensitive capabilityexport_graphno sensitive capabilityfind_pathno sensitive capabilityget_bundle_guideno sensitive capabilityget_conceptno sensitive capabilityget_neighborsno sensitive capabilityget_sourcesno sensitive capabilitygraph_summaryno sensitive capabilitylist_bundlesno sensitive capabilitylist_conceptsno sensitive capabilitylist_remote_bundlesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_typesno sensitive capabilityload_colocated_remote_bundlesno sensitive capabilitypromote_conceptno sensitive capabilityread_documentno sensitive capabilityregenerate_indexesno sensitive capabilityreload_bundlesno sensitive capabilityrename_conceptno sensitive capabilitysearch_conceptsno sensitive capabilitysuggest_concept_pathno sensitive capabilityupdate_conceptno sensitive capabilityvalidate_bundleno sensitive capabilitywrite_conceptno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v1.5.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v1.4.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.3.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v1.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v1.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v0.22.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v0.20.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v0.20.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v0.20.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @copperbox/okf-mcp --online
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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