coordmcp
PyPI
v0.1.2
Published by siddiquesahabaj — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A FastMCP-based Model Context Protocol server for intelligent multi-agent code coordination
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Untrusted-input tools ([get_design_patterns]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_design_patterns] → sinks [send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_design_patterns → send_message
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_design_patternsingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egressanalyze_architectureno sensitive capabilityassign_taskno sensitive capabilitybroadcast_messageno sensitive capabilitycomplete_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydiscover_projectno sensitive capabilityend_contextno sensitive capabilityget_active_agentsno sensitive capabilityget_agent_contextno sensitive capabilityget_agent_profileno sensitive capabilityget_agents_in_projectno sensitive capabilityget_agents_listno sensitive capabilityget_architecture_recommendationno sensitive capabilityget_context_historyno sensitive capabilityget_file_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_locked_filesno sensitive capabilityget_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_module_infono sensitive capabilityget_my_tasksno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_project_dashboardno sensitive capabilityget_project_decisionsno sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_onboarding_context_toolno sensitive capabilityget_project_tasksno sensitive capabilityget_recent_changesno sensitive capabilityget_sent_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_session_logno sensitive capabilityget_system_prompt_toolno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityget_tech_stackno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_guidance_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylock_filesno sensitive capabilitylog_changeno sensitive capabilitymark_message_readno sensitive capabilityregister_agentno sensitive capabilitysave_decisionno sensitive capabilitysearch_decisionsno sensitive capabilitystart_contextno sensitive capabilityswitch_contextno sensitive capabilityunlock_filesno sensitive capabilityupdate_architectureno sensitive capabilityupdate_file_metadatano sensitive capabilityupdate_task_statusno sensitive capabilityupdate_tech_stackno sensitive capabilityvalidate_code_structureno sensitive capabilityvalidate_workflow_state_toolno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan coordmcp --online --registry pypi
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