Convertly Sh MCP Server
@convertly-sh/mcp
npm
v0.3.9
Source verified
Published by convertly-sh — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Tool "move_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_files
medium Tool "delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_files
low Mutating tool "move_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_files
low Mutating tool "delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_files
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 52
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_fileswrites filesdownload_cloud_fileingests untrusted inputget_convertly_docingests untrusted inputlist_cloud_filesreads sensitive datamove_fileswrites filesread_filereads sensitive datasave_cloud_fileingests untrusted inputtransfer_urlingests untrusted inputadjust_mediano sensitive capabilitybuild_cdn_urlno sensitive capability
Show 42 more tools ↓
compress_mediano sensitive capabilityconvert_mediano sensitive capabilityconvertly_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitycopy_filesno sensitive capabilitycreate_archiveno sensitive capabilitycreate_cloud_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_storyboardno sensitive capabilitycreate_workflowno sensitive capabilitydelete_cloud_fileno sensitive capabilitydelete_workflowno sensitive capabilityextract_audiono sensitive capabilityforma_ai_analyzeno sensitive capabilityforma_ai_transformno sensitive capabilitygenerate_thumbnailno sensitive capabilityget_jobno sensitive capabilityimages_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityinspect_mediano sensitive capabilitylist_convertly_docsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_rootsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflow_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflowsno sensitive capabilitypdf_previewno sensitive capabilityplan_organize_folderno sensitive capabilityposter_frameno sensitive capabilityremove_backgroundno sensitive capabilityrename_cloud_fileno sensitive capabilityrename_filesno sensitive capabilityrename_folderno sensitive capabilityrun_workflowno sensitive capabilityscan_folderno sensitive capabilitysearch_convertly_docsno sensitive capabilityset_workflow_activeno sensitive capabilitystrip_metadatano sensitive capabilitytransform_imageno sensitive capabilitytrim_mediano sensitive capabilityupdate_workflowno sensitive capabilityvectorize_mediano sensitive capabilityvideo_to_gifno sensitive capabilitywatermark_mediano sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.9 latest |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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