Contextforge (alfredoizdev) MCP Server
contextforge-mcp
npm
v0.11.0
Published by alfredoizdev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Persistent memory MCP server for Claude Code, Cursor, and GitHub Copilot. Give your AI assistants long-term memory via the Model Context Protocol.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/freshness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/freshness.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; export function pathTouched(changedFiles, relatedPaths) { if (!relatedPaths.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/freshness.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/session-presence.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/session-presence.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; export const HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000; export const EXIT_FLUSH_TIME
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/session-presence.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/update-checker.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/update-checker.js:65`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://registry.npmjs.org/contextforge-mcp/latest", { signal: controller.signal });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/update-checker.js
medium Tool "memory_unlink_project" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "memory_unlink_project" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool memory_unlink_project
low Mutating tool "memory_unlink_project" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "memory_unlink_project" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool memory_unlink_project
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir } from 'os'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
Tools 69
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memory_git_activatenetwork egressmemory_unlink_projectwrites filescollaborators_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_check_freshnessno sensitive capabilitymemory_confirmno sensitive capabilitymemory_correctno sensitive capabilitymemory_create_projectno sensitive capabilitymemory_create_spaceno sensitive capabilitymemory_current_projectno sensitive capabilitymemory_deleteno sensitive capability
Show 59 more tools ↓
memory_delete_batchno sensitive capabilitymemory_delete_projectno sensitive capabilitymemory_delete_spaceno sensitive capabilitymemory_exportno sensitive capabilitymemory_forgetno sensitive capabilitymemory_get_itemno sensitive capabilitymemory_git_commitsno sensitive capabilitymemory_git_connectno sensitive capabilitymemory_git_disconnectno sensitive capabilitymemory_git_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_git_prsno sensitive capabilitymemory_git_syncno sensitive capabilitymemory_helpno sensitive capabilitymemory_importno sensitive capabilitymemory_ingestno sensitive capabilitymemory_ingest_batchno sensitive capabilitymemory_link_projectno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_itemsno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_relationshipsno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_spacesno sensitive capabilitymemory_move_itemno sensitive capabilitymemory_move_spaceno sensitive capabilitymemory_queryno sensitive capabilitymemory_relateno sensitive capabilitymemory_snapshot_createno sensitive capabilitymemory_snapshot_deleteno sensitive capabilitymemory_snapshot_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_snapshot_restoreno sensitive capabilitymemory_statsno sensitive capabilitymemory_updateno sensitive capabilityproject_shareno sensitive capabilityroutines_createno sensitive capabilityroutines_deleteno sensitive capabilityroutines_getno sensitive capabilityroutines_listno sensitive capabilityroutines_run_nowno sensitive capabilityroutines_toggleno sensitive capabilityroutines_updateno sensitive capabilitysession_endno sensitive capabilitysession_listno sensitive capabilitysession_updateno sensitive capabilityskills_createno sensitive capabilityskills_deleteno sensitive capabilityskills_getno sensitive capabilityskills_listno sensitive capabilityskills_runno sensitive capabilityskills_updateno sensitive capabilitytasks_add_commentno sensitive capabilitytasks_assignno sensitive capabilitytasks_createno sensitive capabilitytasks_deleteno sensitive capabilitytasks_listno sensitive capabilitytasks_list_commentsno sensitive capabilitytasks_resolveno sensitive capabilitytasks_resolve_by_nameno sensitive capabilitytasks_startno sensitive capabilitytasks_updateno sensitive capabilitytasks_what_nextno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (69 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.6.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.5.2 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan contextforge-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Contextforge 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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