Context Sync (context-sync) MCP Server
@context-sync/server
npm
v2.0.0
Published by @context-sync — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal Context layer McP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/auto-configurator.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/auto-configurator.cjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const PLATFORM_CONFIGS = require('./platform-configs.cjs'); const yaml = requir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/auto-configurator.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git-hook-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/git-hook-manager.js:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const Database = require('better-sqlite3'); try { // Get commit info
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git-hook-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git-integration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/git-integration.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; export class GitIntegration { workspacePath; constructor(workspacePath)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git-integration.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/git-integration.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/git-integration.js:186`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = this.exec(`git log -${count} --pretty=format:"%H|%s|%an|%ar"`); return output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git-integration.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/install.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/install.cjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const PlatformAutoConfigurator = require('./auto-configurator.cjs'); const re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/install.cjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/setup.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/setup.cjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const PLATFORM_CONFIGS = require('./platform-configs.cjs'); const CONFIG_DI
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/setup.cjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall, postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@context-sync/server" executes preinstall/postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "console.log('\n🧠 Installing Context Sync MCP Server...\n')" ; node bin/install.cjs || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @context-sync/server
Tools 5
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Context Sync Usage Guideno sensitive capabilitycontext-sync-usageno sensitive capabilityDebugging Context Syncno sensitive capabilitydebugging-context-syncno sensitive capabilityTool Flow Patternsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @context-sync/server --onlineOther implementations of Context Sync 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Cross-Tool AI Memory Sync — one source of truth for your AI context, synced everywhere
Cross-device context sync for coding agents via MCP + Git
More in AI, Memory & Reasoning
FDA device & vehicle recall risk for AI agents: recall history, MAUDE trend, risk score.
Open-source MCP server exposing Agent402.Tools' catalog — 500+ strong: 400+ self-hostable tools + 100 multi-tool skill packs (security-audit, trend-analysis, structured-scrape, decode-blob, forecasting-bake-off) for AI agents — browser, web search & answe
Zero-dependency MCP server that gives AI agents a self-updating project memory in AGENTS.md. Returns merge instructions instead of mutating state, so every change is a reviewable diff.
MCP Apps UI resources and server helpers for n8n
MCP server providing comprehensive access to BookStack knowledge management system
MCP server for tracking achievements with STAR methodology