Context (vibhasdutta) MCP Server
context-mcp-server
npm
v1.3.0
Published by vibhasdutta — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Persistent AI memory + codebase knowledge graph MCP server. Works across Claude Code, VS Code Copilot, Google Antigravity, Codex CLI, Hermes Agent, Claude.ai, and ChatGPT.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (codegraph/extractors/ast_extractor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`codegraph/extractors/ast_extractor.py:393`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss try: r = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", "-1", "--format=%cI", "--", abs_path], ca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server codegraph/extractors/ast_extractor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { saveContext, getContext, deleteContext, deleteProject, listProjects
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/templates/antigravity/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/templates/antigravity/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; process.stdin.resume(); process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); let input = ''; pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/templates/antigravity/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/templates/claude/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/templates/claude/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; process.stdin.resume(); process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); let input = ''; pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/templates/claude/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/templates/codex/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/templates/codex/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; process.stdin.resume(); process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); let input = ''; pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/templates/codex/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/templates/hermes/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/templates/hermes/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; process.stdin.resume(); process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); let input = ''; pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/templates/hermes/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/templates/vscode/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/templates/vscode/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; process.stdin.resume(); process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); let input = ''; pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/templates/vscode/hooks/context-mcp-post-tool-use.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/codegraph.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/codegraph.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/codegraph.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/context.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/context.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { guardPath } from '../guard.js'; import { saveContext, updateContext,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/context.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/gitTools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/gitTools.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { resolve as pathResolve } from 'node:path'; import { saveAutoContext }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/gitTools.js
Tools 8
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
codegraph_affectedno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_archno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_buildno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_filterno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_htmlno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_nodesno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_queryno sensitive capabilitycodegraph_reportno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.1.4 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan context-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Context 11
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