Congressmcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "congressmcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "congressmcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "congressmcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 99,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "minimal",
"label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "minimal",
"reasons": [],
"tags": []
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py:470`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py"
},
"evidence": "e_name == \"parser\" else __import__(__name__, fromlist=[\"_\"]) obj = module for part in dotted.split(\".\"):",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py",
"line": 470,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bill_text_cache.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bill_text_cache.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_bill_text_cache.py"
},
"evidence": "_API_KEY\"} result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", script], capture_output=True, tex",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_bill_text_cache.py",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py:663`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py"
},
"evidence": "\"\"\" ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", script], capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py",
"line": 663,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cache_cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cache_cli.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cache_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "(args, env): return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"congress_api\", *args], capture_output=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cache_cli.py",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_e2e_harness.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_e2e_harness.py:447`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_e2e_harness.py"
},
"evidence": "t subprocess return subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SHIM), *args], capture_output=True",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_e2e_harness.py",
"line": 447,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py:139`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py"
},
"evidence": "handler_module = __import__(call.module_name, fromlist=[call.orig_name]) handler = getattr(handler_mo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py",
"line": 139,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py:37`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py"
},
"evidence": "search_and_professional import ( route_research_and_professional_operation) for op in (\"get_congress_statist",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py",
"line": 37,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py:130`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py"
},
"evidence": "handler_module = __import__(call.module_name, fromlist=[call.orig_name]) handler = getattr(handle",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py",
"line": 130,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "amendments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "committee_intelligence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "laws",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "records_and_hearings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "research_and_professional",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "voting_and_nominations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_member_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_member_sponsored_legislation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_member_cosponsored_legislation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_members_by_congress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_members_by_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_members_by_district",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_members_by_congress_state_district",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_committees",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_committee_bills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_committee_reports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_committee_communications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_committee_nominations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "treaties_and_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "de1a14cfdababb75258658ad40e820183ae628330c0eb35c541889734f336433",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 7,
"info": 0
}
}
}