Congressmcp (amurshak) MCP Server
congressmcp
PyPI
v2.2.0
Published by amurshak — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Access 91+ congressional data tools via Claude, Cursor, VS Code, and other MCP clients
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py:470`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e_name == "parser" else __import__(__name__, fromlist=["_"]) obj = module for part in dotted.split("."):
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server congress_api/features/bill_text/index.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bill_text_cache.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bill_text_cache.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _API_KEY"} result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", script], capture_output=True, tex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bill_text_cache.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py:663`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", script], capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bill_text_wire_conformance.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cache_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cache_cli.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (args, env): return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "congress_api", *args], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cache_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_e2e_harness.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_e2e_harness.py:447`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t subprocess return subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SHIM), *args], capture_output=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_e2e_harness.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py:139`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: handler_module = __import__(call.module_name, fromlist=[call.orig_name]) handler = getattr(handler_mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bucket_operation_guard.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py:37`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: search_and_professional import ( route_research_and_professional_operation) for op in ("get_congress_statist
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_honest_search_and_ops.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py:130`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: handler_module = __import__(call.module_name, fromlist=[call.orig_name]) handler = getattr(handle
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_invoke_all_operations_with_defaults.py
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
amendmentsno sensitive capabilitybillsno sensitive capabilitycommittee_intelligenceno sensitive capabilityget_committee_billsno sensitive capabilityget_committee_communicationsno sensitive capabilityget_committee_nominationsno sensitive capabilityget_committee_reportsno sensitive capabilityget_member_cosponsored_legislationno sensitive capabilityget_member_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_member_sponsored_legislationno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
get_members_by_congressno sensitive capabilityget_members_by_congress_state_districtno sensitive capabilityget_members_by_districtno sensitive capabilityget_members_by_stateno sensitive capabilitylawsno sensitive capabilityrecords_and_hearingsno sensitive capabilityresearch_and_professionalno sensitive capabilitysearch_committeesno sensitive capabilitysearch_membersno sensitive capabilitytreaties_and_summariesno sensitive capabilityvoting_and_nominationsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
A 99/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.1.0 |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v2.0.0 |
A 99/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan congressmcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Congressmcp 1
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