Commune MCP Server
commune-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by shanjai-raj — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Commune – email infrastructure for agents. Set up an inbox and send your first email in 30 seconds. Programmatic inboxes, consistent threads, custom domains, attachments, and structured data.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_thread_messages, get_attachment_url, list_available_phone_numbers]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, upload_attachment, send_sms, set_phone_number_webhook, set_phone_number_allow_list, remove_sms_suppression]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_thread_messages, get_attachment_url, list_available_phone_numbers] → sinks [send_email, upload_attachment, send_sms, set_phone_number_webhook, se
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_thread_messages → send_email
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_attachment_urlingests untrusted inputget_thread_messagesingests untrusted inputlist_available_phone_numbersingests untrusted inputremove_sms_suppressionnetwork egresssend_emailnetwork egresssend_smsnetwork egressset_phone_number_allow_listnetwork egressset_phone_number_webhooknetwork egressupload_attachmentnetwork egressassign_threadno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
create_domainno sensitive capabilitycreate_inboxno sensitive capabilitycredits_checkoutno sensitive capabilitydelete_inboxno sensitive capabilityget_credit_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_deliverability_statsno sensitive capabilityget_delivery_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_domain_recordsno sensitive capabilityget_phone_numberno sensitive capabilityget_sms_threadno sensitive capabilityget_suppressionsno sensitive capabilityget_thread_metadatano sensitive capabilitylist_credit_bundlesno sensitive capabilitylist_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_inboxesno sensitive capabilitylist_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilitylist_sms_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylist_sms_suppressionsno sensitive capabilitylist_threadsno sensitive capabilityprovision_phone_numberno sensitive capabilityrelease_phone_numberno sensitive capabilityremove_extraction_schemano sensitive capabilitysearch_smsno sensitive capabilitysearch_threadsno sensitive capabilityset_extraction_schemano sensitive capabilityset_phone_number_block_listno sensitive capabilityset_thread_statusno sensitive capabilitysubmit_feedbackno sensitive capabilitytag_threadno sensitive capabilityuntag_threadno sensitive capabilityupdate_phone_numberno sensitive capabilityverify_domainno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan commune-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
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