Command Vault — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "command-vault-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "command-vault-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "command-vault-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/command_vault/history_parser.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/command_vault/history_parser.py:186`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/command_vault/history_parser.py"
},
"evidence": ".compile(r\"(-i\\s+)[^\\s]+id_rsa[^\\s]*\"), r'\\1{KEY_FILE}'), # Database connection strings (re.compile(r\"(mysql://",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/command_vault/history_parser.py",
"line": 186,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"get_script\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"get_script\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script_id\" on \"get_script\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_script\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script_id\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_script",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script_id"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script_id"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_parser.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_parser.py:296`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_parser.py"
},
"evidence": "hon import requests r = requests.get('http://target') print(r.text) ``` Some prose after code. ''' chunks = par",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_parser.py",
"line": 296,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"get_script\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_script\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_script"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"command-vault-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "command-vault-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"command-vault-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "command-vault-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search_commands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_scripts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tool_examples",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_categories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_command",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_writeups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_script",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_writeup_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_writeup_prose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_related",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_techniques",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enrich",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "history_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7f47833c1e4783d2e6dca7ef3585b3d8cc8f5869e3dd2648f10e2ce19ac84e87",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 2
}
}
}