Command Vault MCP Server
command-vault-mcp
PyPI
v0.8.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Search and retrieve security commands, exploit scripts, and methodology from your pentest writeups and shell history. CLI + MCP server for AI assistants.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/command_vault/history_parser.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/command_vault/history_parser.py:186`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .compile(r"(-i\s+)[^\s]+id_rsa[^\s]*"), r'\1{KEY_FILE}'), # Database connection strings (re.compile(r"(mysql://
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/command_vault/history_parser.py
high Tool "get_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "get_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool get_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_id" on "get_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "get_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool get_script · inputSchema.properties.script_id
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_parser.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_parser.py:296`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: hon import requests r = requests.get('http://target') print(r.text) ``` Some prose after code. ''' chunks = par
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_parser.py
low Mutating tool "get_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "get_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool get_script
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_scriptruns code / shellclear_historyno sensitive capabilityenrichno sensitive capabilityget_tool_examplesno sensitive capabilityget_writeup_summaryno sensitive capabilityhistory_statsno sensitive capabilityindex_historyno sensitive capabilityindex_writeupsno sensitive capabilitylist_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
list_techniquesno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilitysearch_commandsno sensitive capabilitysearch_historyno sensitive capabilitysearch_relatedno sensitive capabilitysearch_scriptsno sensitive capabilitysearch_writeup_proseno sensitive capabilitysuggest_commandno sensitive capabilityvault_statsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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