Cognirepo — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "cognirepo",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "cognirepo"
},
"server": {
"name": "cognirepo"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 9.45,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py:204`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py"
},
"evidence": "\"HEAD\"] return subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode().strip() except Exception:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py",
"line": 204,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", self.root, \"log\", \"--oneline\", f\"-{_GIT_LOG_LINES}",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py",
"line": 173,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/cli/env_wizard.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/env_wizard.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/cli/env_wizard.py"
},
"evidence": "try: subprocess.run([editor, dotenv_path], check=False) # nosec B603 except Exception:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/cli/env_wizard.py",
"line": 136,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/cli/seed.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/seed.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/cli/seed.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 [\"git\", \"-C\", abs_root, \"log\", \"--pretty=format:%aI|%s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/cli/seed.py",
"line": 69,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/cli/wizard.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/wizard.py:762`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/cli/wizard.py"
},
"evidence": "time.sleep(0.8) os.system(\"clear\") return None # caller loops return cfg",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/cli/wizard.py",
"line": 762,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/server/mcp_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/server/mcp_server.py:1079`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/server/mcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "terns) ─ proc = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 [\"grep\", \"-rn\", \"--include=*.py\", \"--include=*.js\", \"-",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/server/mcp_server.py",
"line": 1079,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/tools/benchmark.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/tools/benchmark.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/tools/benchmark.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"grep\", \"-rl\", query_keyword, str(repo_root), \"--inclu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/tools/benchmark.py",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/tools/bg_progress.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/tools/bg_progress.py:144`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/tools/bg_progress.py"
},
"evidence": "w.py\") try: subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, script], start_new_session=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/tools/bg_progress.py",
"line": 144,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (interface/tools/git_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/tools/git_utils.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/tools/git_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "interface/tools/git_utils.py",
"line": 70,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (interface/cli/main.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/main.py:680`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "interface/cli/main.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(_pkg_name) _ok(f\"Package — {_pkg_name} importable\") except Import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "interface/cli/main.py",
"line": 680,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (data/graph/knowledge_graph.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/graph/knowledge_graph.py:131`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/graph/knowledge_graph.py"
},
"evidence": "ss self.G = pickle.loads(raw) # nosec B301 except Exception as exc: # pylint: disable=broad-except",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "data/graph/knowledge_graph.py",
"line": 131,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (data/graph/org_graph.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/graph/org_graph.py:85`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/graph/org_graph.py"
},
"evidence": ")) self.G = pickle.loads(raw) # nosec B301 except FileNotFoundError: logger.debug(\"OrgG",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "data/graph/org_graph.py",
"line": 85,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_main_extended.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_main_extended.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli_main_extended.py"
},
"evidence": "timeout=15): return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"interface.cli.main\"] + list(args), captu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cli_main_extended.py",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_context_builder.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_context_builder.py:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_context_builder.py"
},
"evidence": "bed\"): try: __import__(_dep) except ImportError: sys.modules[_dep] = MagicMock() # Only set DiGr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_context_builder.py",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_fallback_chain.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_fallback_chain.py:25`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_fallback_chain.py"
},
"evidence": "bed\"): try: __import__(_dep) except ImportError: sys.modules[_dep] = MagicMock() _HEAVY_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_fallback_chain.py",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_local_adapter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_local_adapter.py:19`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_local_adapter.py"
},
"evidence": "bed\"): try: __import__(_dep) except ImportError: sys.modules[_dep] = MagicMock() _LOCAL_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_local_adapter.py",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py:24`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(name) except ImportError: sys.modules[name] = MagicMock() # O",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"cognirepo\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "cognirepo"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "store_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supersede_learning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "retrieve_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "org_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "org_wide_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cross_repo_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_org_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "org_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cross_repo_traverse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "who_calls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_symbol_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_service_endpoints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subgraph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "episodic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_episode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "graph_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "semantic_search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dependency_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "architecture_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "context_pack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent_bootstrap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_last_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_user_preference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_error_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_error",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7276f0eedc88be3b94dcde080909ab41da6d1188f046120147fcf5e3a3ef194a",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 3,
"low": 5,
"info": 1
}
}
}