Cognirepo MCP Server
cognirepo
PyPI
v2.0.0
Published by ashlesh-t — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Unsafe deserialization ×2 MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 7 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Shell/command execution in server code (intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py:204`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "HEAD"] return subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode().strip() except Exception:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server intelligence/indexer/ast_indexer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", self.root, "log", "--oneline", f"-{_GIT_LOG_LINES}
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server intelligence/indexer/doc_ingester.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/cli/env_wizard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/env_wizard.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run([editor, dotenv_path], check=False) # nosec B603 except Exception:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/cli/env_wizard.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/cli/seed.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/seed.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 ["git", "-C", abs_root, "log", "--pretty=format:%aI|%s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/cli/seed.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/cli/wizard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/wizard.py:762`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: time.sleep(0.8) os.system("clear") return None # caller loops return cfg
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/cli/wizard.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/server/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/server/mcp_server.py:1079`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: terns) ─ proc = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 ["grep", "-rn", "--include=*.py", "--include=*.js", "-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/server/mcp_server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/tools/benchmark.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/tools/benchmark.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["grep", "-rl", query_keyword, str(repo_root), "--inclu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/tools/benchmark.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/tools/bg_progress.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/tools/bg_progress.py:144`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: w.py") try: subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, script], start_new_session=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/tools/bg_progress.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (interface/tools/git_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`interface/tools/git_utils.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/tools/git_utils.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (interface/cli/main.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`interface/cli/main.py:680`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(_pkg_name) _ok(f"Package — {_pkg_name} importable") except Import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server interface/cli/main.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (data/graph/knowledge_graph.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`data/graph/knowledge_graph.py:131`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss self.G = pickle.loads(raw) # nosec B301 except Exception as exc: # pylint: disable=broad-except
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server data/graph/knowledge_graph.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (data/graph/org_graph.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`data/graph/org_graph.py:85`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: )) self.G = pickle.loads(raw) # nosec B301 except FileNotFoundError: logger.debug("OrgG
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server data/graph/org_graph.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_main_extended.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_main_extended.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: timeout=15): return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "interface.cli.main"] + list(args), captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli_main_extended.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_context_builder.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_context_builder.py:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bed"): try: __import__(_dep) except ImportError: sys.modules[_dep] = MagicMock() # Only set DiGr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_context_builder.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_fallback_chain.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_fallback_chain.py:25`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bed"): try: __import__(_dep) except ImportError: sys.modules[_dep] = MagicMock() _HEAVY_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_fallback_chain.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_local_adapter.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_local_adapter.py:19`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bed"): try: __import__(_dep) except ImportError: sys.modules[_dep] = MagicMock() _LOCAL_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_local_adapter.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py:24`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(name) except ImportError: sys.modules[name] = MagicMock() # O
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_tier1_dogfood.py
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
architecture_overviewno sensitive capabilitycontext_packno sensitive capabilitycross_repo_searchno sensitive capabilitycross_repo_traverseno sensitive capabilitydependency_graphno sensitive capabilityepisodic_searchno sensitive capabilityexplain_changeno sensitive capabilityfind_symbol_pathno sensitive capabilityget_agent_bootstrapno sensitive capabilityget_error_patternsno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
get_last_contextno sensitive capabilityget_service_endpointsno sensitive capabilityget_session_briefno sensitive capabilityget_session_historyno sensitive capabilityget_user_profileno sensitive capabilitygraph_statsno sensitive capabilitylink_reposno sensitive capabilitylist_org_contextno sensitive capabilitylog_episodeno sensitive capabilitylookup_symbolno sensitive capabilityorg_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityorg_searchno sensitive capabilityorg_wide_searchno sensitive capabilityrecord_decisionno sensitive capabilityrecord_errorno sensitive capabilityrecord_user_preferenceno sensitive capabilityretrieve_memoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_docsno sensitive capabilitysearch_tokenno sensitive capabilitysemantic_search_codeno sensitive capabilitystore_memoryno sensitive capabilitysubgraphno sensitive capabilitysupersede_learningno sensitive capabilitywho_callsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
B 84/100 | 17 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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