Cogmemai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "cogmemai-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "cogmemai-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "cogmemai-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, unlinkSync, readdir",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/cli.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/project.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/project.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/project.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { realpathSync } from 'fs'; const cache = new Map(); export function dete",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/project.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { detectProjectId } from './project.js'; import { FLAG_DIR, VERSION, SESS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:77`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "checkForUpdate() { fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/cogmemai-mcp/latest', { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(50",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 77,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/cli.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli.js:286`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "' '); try { execSync(`claude mcp add cogmemai cogmemai-mcp ${envStr} --scope user`, { stdio: 'pipe', timeout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "build/cli.js",
"line": 286,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/tools.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools.js:1449`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools.js"
},
"evidence": "const log = execSync(`git log --oneline ${snapshot.commit.slice(0, 8)}..HEAD`, { enc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "build/tools.js",
"line": 1449,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "save_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_trash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_session_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_memory_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_memory_versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_analytics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "promote_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "consolidate_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_correction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stale_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "feedback_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_principles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8f6ffb56576de63b8f141d48a4015071928e6e58771a653f1960c78f2dcf686d",
"stats": {
"tools": 37,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}