Email — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@codefuturist/email-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@codefuturist/email-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@codefuturist/email-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/scheduler.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/scheduler.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/scheduler.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/scheduler.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/local-calendar.service.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/local-calendar.service.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/local-calendar.service.js"
},
"evidence": "execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/services/local-calendar.service.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/notifier.service.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/notifier.service.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/notifier.service.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { mcpLog } from '../logging.js'; import { validateWebhookUrl } from '../s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/services/notifier.service.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/reminders.service.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/reminders.service.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/reminders.service.js"
},
"evidence": "execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); /",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/services/reminders.service.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([download_attachment, get_emails, mark_email]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, forward_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "download_attachment → send_email"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [download_attachment, get_emails, mark_email] → sinks [send_email, forward_email]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"download_attachment",
"get_emails",
"mark_email"
],
"sinks": [
"send_email",
"forward_email"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/scheduler.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/scheduler.js:112`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/scheduler.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`launchctl load \"${LAUNCHD_PLIST}\"`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); } catch {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/cli/scheduler.js",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"download_attachment",
"get_emails",
"mark_email"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"send_email",
"forward_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_email_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_calendar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_to_calendar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_calendar_permissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_reminders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_email_for_scheduling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_emails",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_email_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_mailbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_mailbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_mailbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_email_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_mailboxes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_email",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_scheduled",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_scheduled",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "reply_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forward_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"forward_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_watcher_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_presets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_hooks_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_notification_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_notification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_alerts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6b8fbbcace170477ee9da018d73e6ac3ef1e16a72c2e171e8341a2aafb94f670",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}