Email (codefuturist) MCP Server
@codefuturist/email-mcp
npm
v0.2.3
Source verified
Published by codefuturist — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Email MCP server with IMAP and SMTP support.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/scheduler.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/scheduler.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/scheduler.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/local-calendar.service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/local-calendar.service.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/local-calendar.service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/notifier.service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/notifier.service.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { mcpLog } from '../logging.js'; import { validateWebhookUrl } from '../s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/notifier.service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/reminders.service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/reminders.service.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/reminders.service.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_attachment, get_emails, mark_email]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, forward_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_attachment, get_emails, mark_email] → sinks [send_email, forward_email]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_attachment → send_email
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/scheduler.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/scheduler.js:112`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`launchctl load "${LAUNCHD_PLIST}"`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); } catch {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/scheduler.js
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputforward_emailnetwork egressget_emailsingests untrusted inputmark_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressadd_labelno sensitive capabilityadd_to_calendarno sensitive capabilityanalyze_email_for_schedulingno sensitive capabilityapply_templateno sensitive capabilitybulk_actionno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
cancel_scheduledno sensitive capabilitycheck_calendar_permissionsno sensitive capabilitycheck_healthno sensitive capabilitycheck_notification_setupno sensitive capabilityconfigure_alertsno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_mailboxno sensitive capabilitycreate_reminderno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_mailboxno sensitive capabilityextract_calendarno sensitive capabilityextract_contactsno sensitive capabilityfind_email_folderno sensitive capabilityget_emailno sensitive capabilityget_email_statsno sensitive capabilityget_email_statusno sensitive capabilityget_hooks_configno sensitive capabilityget_threadno sensitive capabilityget_watcher_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_mailboxesno sensitive capabilitylist_presetsno sensitive capabilitylist_remindersno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduledno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitymove_emailno sensitive capabilityremove_labelno sensitive capabilityrename_mailboxno sensitive capabilityreply_emailno sensitive capabilitysave_draftno sensitive capabilityschedule_emailno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysend_draftno sensitive capabilitytest_notificationno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.3 latest |
B 84/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @codefuturist/email-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Email 19
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 20 side by side →
MCP server for email via IMAP/SMTP — read, search, send, and manage emails
MCP server for Gmail operations
Universal mailbox MCP server with automatic provider configuration and mail sending for services such as QQ Mail, 163, Outlook, and corporate email.
MCP server for Blip disposable email — create inboxes, receive emails, extract OTP codes
MCP server for the Vorlek API — email tools, catalog discovery, and operation lookup across SendGrid, Mailchimp, and Klaviyo.
通用邮箱MCP服务器 - 支持QQ、163、Gmail（由于谷歌政策不支持OAuth2.0，所以无法使用）、Outlook、企业邮箱等多种邮箱服务商的自动配置和邮件发送功能
More in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.