Claude Talk To Figma (arinspunk) MCP Server
claude-talk-to-figma-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by arinspunk — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Claude Desktop Talk to Figma MCP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/launcher.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import os from 'os'; import readli
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/launcher.js
Tools 92
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_pagesingests untrusted inputapply_image_transformno sensitive capabilityapply_variable_to_nodeno sensitive capabilityboolean_operationno sensitive capabilityclone_nodeno sensitive capabilityconvert_to_frameno sensitive capabilitycreate_component_from_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_component_instanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_component_setno sensitive capabilitycreate_connectorno sensitive capability
Show 82 more tools ↓
create_effect_styleno sensitive capabilitycreate_ellipseno sensitive capabilitycreate_frameno sensitive capabilitycreate_pageno sensitive capabilitycreate_paint_styleno sensitive capabilitycreate_polygonno sensitive capabilitycreate_rectangleno sensitive capabilitycreate_sectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_shape_with_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_starno sensitive capabilitycreate_stickyno sensitive capabilitycreate_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_text_styleno sensitive capabilitydelete_nodeno sensitive capabilitydelete_pageno sensitive capabilitydetach_instanceno sensitive capabilityduplicate_pageno sensitive capabilityexport_node_as_imageno sensitive capabilityflatten_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_annotationno sensitive capabilityget_document_infono sensitive capabilityget_figjam_elementsno sensitive capabilityget_gridno sensitive capabilityget_guideno sensitive capabilityget_image_from_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_local_componentsno sensitive capabilityget_node_infono sensitive capabilityget_nodes_infono sensitive capabilityget_reactionsno sensitive capabilityget_remote_componentsno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_styled_text_segmentsno sensitive capabilityget_stylesno sensitive capabilityget_svgno sensitive capabilityget_variablesno sensitive capabilitygroup_nodesno sensitive capabilityinsert_childno sensitive capabilityjoin_channelno sensitive capabilityload_font_asyncno sensitive capabilitymove_nodeno sensitive capabilityrename_nodeno sensitive capabilityrename_pageno sensitive capabilityreorder_nodeno sensitive capabilityreplace_image_fillno sensitive capabilityresize_nodeno sensitive capabilityrotate_nodeno sensitive capabilityscan_text_nodesno sensitive capabilityset_annotationno sensitive capabilityset_auto_layoutno sensitive capabilityset_corner_radiusno sensitive capabilityset_current_pageno sensitive capabilityset_effect_style_idno sensitive capabilityset_effectsno sensitive capabilityset_fill_colorno sensitive capabilityset_font_nameno sensitive capabilityset_font_sizeno sensitive capabilityset_font_weightno sensitive capabilityset_gradientno sensitive capabilityset_gridno sensitive capabilityset_guideno sensitive capabilityset_imageno sensitive capabilityset_image_fillno sensitive capabilityset_image_filtersno sensitive capabilityset_instance_variantno sensitive capabilityset_letter_spacingno sensitive capabilityset_line_heightno sensitive capabilityset_multiple_text_contentsno sensitive capabilityset_node_propertiesno sensitive capabilityset_paragraph_spacingno sensitive capabilityset_reactionsno sensitive capabilityset_selection_colorsno sensitive capabilityset_sticky_textno sensitive capabilityset_stroke_colorno sensitive capabilityset_svgno sensitive capabilityset_text_alignno sensitive capabilityset_text_caseno sensitive capabilityset_text_contentno sensitive capabilityset_text_decorationno sensitive capabilityset_text_style_idno sensitive capabilityset_variableno sensitive capabilityswitch_variable_modeno sensitive capabilityungroup_nodesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (92 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan claude-talk-to-figma-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Claude Talk To Figma 1
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