Claude Project — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "claude-project",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "claude-project"
},
"server": {
"name": "claude-project"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 85,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/daemon.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/daemon.js:149`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); return execSync('which claude-project', { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/daemon.js",
"line": 149,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/hooks.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/hooks.js:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/hooks.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const which = execSync('which claude-project 2>/dev/null', { encoding:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/hooks.js",
"line": 67,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/install-ext.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/install-ext.js:215`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/install-ext.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); execSync(`\"${LSREGISTER}\" -f \"${APP_DIR}\"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' });",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/install-ext.js",
"line": 215,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/mcp.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/mcp.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "xports.mcp = mcp; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const paths_js_1 = require(\"../lib/paths.js\"); funct",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/mcp.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/automation.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/automation.js:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/automation.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const crypto_1 = require(\"crypto\"); const paths_js_1",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lib/automation.js",
"line": 69,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const crypto_1 = require(\"crypto\"); const sdk_1 = __",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/commands/daemon.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/daemon.js:161`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "hild_process'); execSync(`launchctl load -w \"${PLIST_PATH}\"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }); console.log(` Loa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/commands/daemon.js",
"line": 161,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/commands/install-ext.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/install-ext.js:216`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/install-ext.js"
},
"evidence": "_process'); execSync(`\"${LSREGISTER}\" -f \"${APP_DIR}\"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }); console.log(` R",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/commands/install-ext.js",
"line": 216,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "init_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_time",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "note_discovery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_dispatch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_dispatches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_dispatch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telemetry_preview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_file_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_related_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "register_pd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_pd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_pd_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_negotiation_threshold",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8d457964d54730d758d679c9e0512afa46d1d94a929621176e9156e9dcebeff7",
"stats": {
"tools": 28,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}