Claude Project MCP Server
claude-project
npm
v5.2.0
Source verified
Published by infraax — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Project brain for Claude Code — .claude-project v5, event log, registry, dispatch queue, agent orchestration, daemon, MCP memory server, CLI, VS Code integration, research instrumentation, Protocol Documents, typed dispatch, prompt caching
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 6 = 85. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/daemon.js:149`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); return execSync('which claude-project', { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/hooks.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/hooks.js:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const which = execSync('which claude-project 2>/dev/null', { encoding:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/hooks.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/install-ext.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/install-ext.js:215`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); execSync(`"${LSREGISTER}" -f "${APP_DIR}"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/install-ext.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/mcp.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xports.mcp = mcp; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const paths_js_1 = require("../lib/paths.js"); funct
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/automation.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/automation.js:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const crypto_1 = require("crypto"); const paths_js_1
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/automation.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const crypto_1 = require("crypto"); const sdk_1 = __
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/dispatch-runner.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/commands/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/daemon.js:161`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: hild_process'); execSync(`launchctl load -w "${PLIST_PATH}"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }); console.log(` Loa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/daemon.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/commands/install-ext.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/install-ext.js:216`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _process'); execSync(`"${LSREGISTER}" -f "${APP_DIR}"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }); console.log(` R
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/install-ext.js
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesreads sensitive datacheck_negotiation_thresholdno sensitive capabilitycomplete_dispatchno sensitive capabilitycreate_dispatchno sensitive capabilitydispatch_taskno sensitive capabilityfind_related_filesno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_file_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_pdno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
get_project_infono sensitive capabilityget_timeno sensitive capabilityinit_projectno sensitive capabilitylist_dispatchesno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylog_decisionno sensitive capabilitylog_eventno sensitive capabilitylog_pd_usageno sensitive capabilitymemory_searchno sensitive capabilitymilestoneno sensitive capabilitynote_discoveryno sensitive capabilityquery_memoryno sensitive capabilityregister_pdno sensitive capabilitysearch_pdno sensitive capabilityset_contextno sensitive capabilityset_file_summaryno sensitive capabilitystore_memoryno sensitive capabilitytelemetry_previewno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.2.0 latest |
B 85/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan claude-project --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.