Claude Comms — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "claude-comms",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "claude-comms"
},
"server": {
"name": "claude-comms"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (hatch_build.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`hatch_build.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "hatch_build.py"
},
"evidence": "\"CI\"] = \"true\" subprocess.run( [\"pnpm\", \"install\", \"--frozen-lockfile\"], cwd=web_src,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "hatch_build.py",
"line": 64,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/claude_comms/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/claude_comms/cli.py:1625`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/claude_comms/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "eground proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/claude_comms/cli.py",
"line": 1625,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts"
},
"evidence": "ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtemp, mkdir, writeFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js:193`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js"
},
"evidence": "/portal.js'; return import(portalLibPath).then((mod) => { expect(typeof mod.portal).toBe('function'); co",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js",
"line": 193,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"claude-comms\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "claude-comms"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "comms_join",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_leave",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_thread_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_status_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_status_clear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_profile_status_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_profile_status_clear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_react",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_reactions_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_update_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_artifact_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_artifact_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_artifact_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_artifact_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_artifact_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_conversation_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_conversation_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_get_channel_role",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_conversation_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_conversation_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_conversation_unarchive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_invite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_kick",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "comms_dm_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b0065a7d47e7ce1fcc11dc80e274d8bfb67693f6cdf133f1cda6bc73564d8540",
"stats": {
"tools": 30,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 1
}
}
}