Claude Comms MCP Server
claude-comms
PyPI
v0.5.0
Published by aztec03hub — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (hatch_build.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`hatch_build.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "CI"] = "true" subprocess.run( ["pnpm", "install", "--frozen-lockfile"], cwd=web_src,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hatch_build.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/claude_comms/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/claude_comms/cli.py:1625`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eground proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/claude_comms/cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtemp, mkdir, writeFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server web/e2e/fixtures/daemon.ts
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js:193`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /portal.js'; return import(portalLibPath).then((mod) => { expect(typeof mod.portal).toBe('function'); co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server web/tests/context-menu-top-layer-bugfix.spec.js
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
comms_artifact_createno sensitive capabilitycomms_artifact_deleteno sensitive capabilitycomms_artifact_getno sensitive capabilitycomms_artifact_listno sensitive capabilitycomms_artifact_updateno sensitive capabilitycomms_checkno sensitive capabilitycomms_conversation_archiveno sensitive capabilitycomms_conversation_createno sensitive capabilitycomms_conversation_deleteno sensitive capabilitycomms_conversation_unarchiveno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
comms_conversation_updateno sensitive capabilitycomms_conversationsno sensitive capabilitycomms_dm_openno sensitive capabilitycomms_get_channel_roleno sensitive capabilitycomms_historyno sensitive capabilitycomms_inviteno sensitive capabilitycomms_joinno sensitive capabilitycomms_kickno sensitive capabilitycomms_leaveno sensitive capabilitycomms_membersno sensitive capabilitycomms_profile_status_clearno sensitive capabilitycomms_profile_status_setno sensitive capabilitycomms_reactno sensitive capabilitycomms_reactions_getno sensitive capabilitycomms_readno sensitive capabilitycomms_sendno sensitive capabilitycomms_status_clearno sensitive capabilitycomms_status_setno sensitive capabilitycomms_thread_readno sensitive capabilitycomms_update_nameno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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