Chimeralang — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "chimeralang-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "chimeralang-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "chimeralang-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([chimera_budget]) and tools that can send data out ([chimera_ethical_eval]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "chimera_budget → chimera_ethical_eval"
},
"evidence": "sources [chimera_budget] → sinks [chimera_ethical_eval]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"chimera_budget"
],
"sinks": [
"chimera_ethical_eval"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"chimera_ethical_eval\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"chimera_ethical_eval\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chimera_ethical_eval"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"chimera_ethical_eval\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"chimera_ethical_eval\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chimera_ethical_eval"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_advanced_token_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_advanced_token_tools.py:301`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_advanced_token_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "Process: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"chimeralang_mcp.cli\", \"hook\", \"--event\", \"pr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_advanced_token_tools.py",
"line": 301,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_hook_and_verify_perf.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_hook_and_verify_perf.py:76`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_hook_and_verify_perf.py"
},
"evidence": "Process: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"chimeralang_mcp.cli\", \"hook\", \"--event\", eve",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_hook_and_verify_perf.py",
"line": 76,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_session_token_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_session_token_tools.py:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_session_token_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "Process: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"chimeralang_mcp.cli\", \"hook\", \"--event\", \"po",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_session_token_tools.py",
"line": 110,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"chimera_budget"
],
"externalSink": [
"chimera_ethical_eval"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"chimera_budget",
"chimera_ethical_eval"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: chimera_budget → chimera_ethical_eval."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "chimera_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_confident",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_explore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_gate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_detect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_constrain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_typecheck",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_prove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_claims",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_provenance_merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_materials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_fracture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_optimize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_compress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_budget",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_token\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_cost_estimate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_cost_track",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_csm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_budget_lock",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_causal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_deliberate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_metacognize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_meta_learn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_quantum_vote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_plan_goals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_world_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_safety_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_ethical_eval",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_embodied",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_social",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_transfer_learn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_evolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_self_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_summarize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_cache_mark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_log_compress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_overhead_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_dedup_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_session_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_glyph_directive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chimera_glyph_translate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0c79c207e86f6ef231cda48d6ad661ad545107e661d2fe35bbd59766d1a83183",
"stats": {
"tools": 51,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}